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RECENT CASES
Constitutional Law-Due Process-Replevin Statutes
Allowing Seizure of Property Without Notice and
Opportunity for Hearing Violate Due Process Clause of
Fourteenth Amendment
Appellant-debtors' purchased household items' from respondent-
creditors under conditional sales contracts that permitted creditor re-
possession upon default.3 When appellants allegedly defaulted, respon-
dents summarily replevied the goods pursuant to the Florida and Penn-
sylvania statutes4 that authorize prejudgment replevin of property with-
out prior notice and opportunity for hearing. Appellants brought suit
I. The present action consolidates 2 independent suits. The first suit was brought in federal
district court in Florida by a plaintiff who had refused to pay a final installment under a conditional
sales contract because of seller's alleged refusal to service the goods as required by the contract.
When seller replevied the goods, plaintiff brought suit for declaratory and injunctive relief against
continued enforcement of the procedural provisions of the Florida replevin statute. Fuentes v.
Faircloth, 317 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. Fla. 1970). The second suit was brought by 4 Pennsylvania
plaintiffs who sought a permanent injunction against continued enforcement of the Pennsylvania
replevin statute. Three of the 4, like the Florida appellant, had had their possessions seized under
writs of replevin when they failed to complete their installment payments. The fourth plaintiff had
a more bizarre experience-her son's clothes, furniture, and toys were replevied by her former
husband after a child custody dispute. Epps v. Cortese, 326 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
2. The Florida appellant had purchased a stove and a phonograph. The Pennsylvania appel-
lants had purchased a bed, a table, stools, a stereo set, rings, a diamond watch, and a television
roof antenna.
3. The contracts signed by the Florida appellant provided "in the event of default of any
payment or payments, Seller at its option may take back the merchandise." Fuentes v. Faircloth,
317 F. Supp. 954, 956 (S.D. Fla. 1970). The contracts signed by the Pennsylvania appellants
provided "[1]f I default in any payment . . . you or assigns may retake the merchancise .
Epps v. Cortese, 326 F. Supp. 127, 130 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
4. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 78.01, 78.07, 78.08, 78.10, 78.13 (Supp. 1972-73); PA. STAT. tit. 12,
§ 1821 (1967); PA. R. Civ. P. 1073, 1076-77. In essence, these sections provide that any person
whose chattels are wrongfully detained may obtain a writ of replevin to recover them. The applicant
must assert to the clerk that he is entitled to the writ and must file a security bond for double the
value of the property. (Under Florida law, but not Pennsylvania law, the applicant must also file
a complaint.) If the creditor fails to maintain his right to possession (under Florida law, if he fails
to prosecute or loses the accompanying lawsuit), he has to pay the party entitled to the property
the value of the property plus costs sustained by reason of the issuance of the writ. After the
property has been seized, the debtor has 3 days in which to reclaim possession by posting his own
security bond equal in amount to that posted by the creditor. If the debtor does not post bond,
after the 3-day period the property is turned over to the creditor (pending final judgment in the
repossession suit in Florida). Since under Pennsylvania law the creditor is not required to file a




challenging the constitutionality of these statutes on the ground that by
authorizing the state's agents to repossess property without first provid-
ing the possessor with notice and an opportunity to be heard, the stat-
utes allow deprivation of property without due process of law and thus
violate the fourteenth amendment.' Respondents asserted that the due
process clause requires a preseizure hearing only for takings of "neces-
sary" property, not household goods; the ex parte repossessions were
only temporary and therefore not "deprivations" within the meaning of
the fourteenth amendment; and that appellants had waived any right to
preseizure hearings by signing contracts that expressly granted reposses-
sion rights to the creditors. The United States District Courts for the
Districts of Florida and Eastern Pennsylvania adopted respondents'
position.' On direct appeal to the United States Supreme Court, held,
vacated and remanded. Absent compelling state or creditor interests or
contractual waiver, state statutes authorizing replevin of property with-
out prior notice and an opportunity for a hearing violate the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment.7 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67
(1972).
Replevin is an ancient form of action8 that continues to have mod-
ern statutory vitality as a creditor's remedy to recover goods from a
defaulting debtor,' because its summary repossession procedures protect
the chattels from destruction, misuse, or concealment and conserve the
state's financial resources and administrative time.1" Modern replevin is
initiated by plaintiff's posting bond and claiming that specified goods
belonging to him are in defendant's unlawful possession. A writ of
replevin is then issued commanding the sheriff to seize the goods from
the defendant, to keep them in custody for a fixed time, and, if defen-
dant does not post a counterbond in that time, to turn the goods over
5. Appellants further contended that the prejudgment replevin procedures violated the search
and seizure provision of the fourth amendment. The Court, however, did not reach this issue.
6. Epps v. Cortese, 326 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Fuentes v. Faircloth, 317 F. Supp.
954 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
7. Relying upon this decision, a federal district court has declared Tennessee's replevin
provisions unconstitutional. See Mitchell v. State, Civil No. 72-241 (W.D. Tenn., Sept. 28, 1972).
8. Replevin is a possessory action that arose at the end of the twelfth or the beginning of
the thirteenth century. The procedure evolved to combat the harshness of distraint, a process
whereby landowners were empowered to seize summarily the personal goods of their tenants until
the landowner's claim was satisfied. J. COBBEY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF REPLEVIN
I (1890). See generally J. WILKINSON, THE PRACTICE IN THE ACTION OF REPLEVIN (1834).
9. The modem action of replevin is a hybrid of common-law replevin and common-law
detinue, the latter being a remedy for an unlawful detention of chattels. Comment, Laprease and
Fuentes: Replevin Reconsidered, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 886, 888 (1971).
10. See, e.g., Epps v. Cortese, 326 F. Supp. 127, 135 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
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to the plaintiff." As in other prejudgment creditor remedies, 12 plaintiff's
claim is heard ex parte and thus defendant cannot contest the action
until after the goods have been repossessed.13 This kind of prejudgment
seizure provision was found constitutional by the Supreme Court in
McKay v. Mclnnes." In Mclnnes, the Court in a per curiam opinion
upheld the validity of a prejudgment attachment effected without prior
notice or opportunity to be heard, apparently on the rationale of the
lower court that, since the attachment was immediately followed by a
judicial proceeding in which notice was given and the parties were al-
lowed to be heard, the procedure does not constitute a sufficient "depri-
vation" to violate the due process clause. The Mclnnes decision re-
mained undisturbed for 40 years until the landmark case of Sniadach
v. Family Finance Corp.'5 impliedly overruled Mclnnes" by holding
that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment requires notice
and an opportunity for hearing prior to prejudgment wage garnishment.
The Sniadach Court emphasized that wages were a "specialized type of
property," the garnishment of which would impose tremendous hard-
ship on the debtor. 7 This emphasis, however, produced conflicting deci-
sions on the question whether property other than wages should be
accorded the due process safeguards enunciated in Sniadach. On one
side, several courts applied Sniadach to strike down summary prejudg-
ment procedures." For example, in Laprease v. Raymours Furniture
Co." the creditor, pursuant to New York law, replevied a bed, chest,
highchair, and other household goods without giving the debtor an op-
portunity for a hearing. The court declared that these items were as
"specialized" as the wages in Sniadach, since they were necessary for
day-to-day living and were property the "taking of which on the unilat-
eral command of an adverse party 'may impose tremendous hardships'
on the purchaser .... ,,2 The court therefore concluded that replevy
II. See, e.g., note 4 supra.
12. Other creditor remedies, for example, are garnishment and attachment. These remedies,
like replevin, involve involuntary dispossession of the defendant-attachment seizes property in the
debtor's possession, but garnishment seizes the debtor's funds, effects, or credits in the possession
of a third party. See 22 VAND. L. REV. 1400, 1401 (1969).
13. See, e.g., note 4 supra.
14. 279 U.S. 820, affg per curiam 127 Me. 110, 141 A. 699 (1928).
15. 395 U.S. 337 (1969), noted in 22 VAND. L. REV. 1400 (1969).
16. See 1969 DUKE L.J. 1285, 1290.
17. 395 U.S. at 340.
18. E.g., Aaron v. Clark, 40 U.S.L.W. 2756 (N.D. Ga., May 4, 1972) (garnishment statute
held unconstitutional); Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972) (repossession statute
held unconstitutional). Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), in which an administrative regula-
tion terminating welfare benefits was held unconstitutional, did little to resolve the conflict.
19. 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
20. Id. at 722.
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of the goods without notice and an opportunity for hearing denied the
debtor due process of law. On the other side, a few courts restricted the
scope of Sniadach to prejudgment garnishment of wages.2' In Brunswick
Corp. v. J & P Inc.22 Brunswick replevied bowling equipment sold to J
& P under a conditional sales contract when J & P failed to make a
payment. The Brunswick Court distinguished Sniadach as a "unique
case involving a specialized type of property" and inapplicable to an
action to enforce a security interest. 23 In light of decisions like
Laprease, in which the property involved was held "necessary" to one's
existence, and Brunswick, in which the property was held "unneces-
sary," several commentators felt that Sniadach and its progeny had
employed a test of balancing the interests of the state and creditor
against those of the debtor to determine, in each factual context,
whether due process required notice and an opportunity for hearing. 24
If the state or creditor interest outweighed the interest of the debtor, the
summary prejudgment procedure would not be violative of due pro-
cess.25 Even in situations in which the debtor interest seems certain to
prevail, however, the courts may confront the additional problem of the
creditor's attempting to secure the debtor's waiver of due process
rights.2" Although the Supreme Court has stated that due process rights
may be waived by contract,27 most courts have declined to find a waiver
when there is a standard form contract and a great disparity of bargain-
21. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Adams, 322 F. Supp. 645 (D. Md. 1971) (replevin statute upheld);
Young v. Ridley, 309 F. Supp. 1308 (D.D.C. 1970) (foreclosure statute upheld).
22. 424 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1970).
23. Id. at 105.
24. See Comment, Provisional Remedies in New York Reappraised Under Sniadach v.
Family Finance Corp.: A Constitutional Fly in the Creditor's Ointment, 34 ALBANY L. REV. 426
(1970); Note, 49 N.C.L. REv. 763 (1971); Note, Forcible Prejudgment Seizures, 25 Sw. L.J. 331
(1971); Comment, Replevin: A Due Process Prescription for an Ancient Writ, 45 TEMP. L.Q. 259
(1972). One author suggested that there were no cogent reasons for limiting Sniadach to wage
garnishment so long as the following factors were present: "(1) a prejudgment seizure without
notice and an opportunity to be heard; (2) a 'strong' (i.e., corporate or institutional) creditor versus
a 'weak' consumer-debtor; (3) an absence of 'special' creditor interest; (4) an absence of 'special'
state interest (i.e., where the property involved is not dangerous to health and does not otherwise
affect the public interest); and (5) a type of property intrinsically valuable to the debtor but only
extrinsically valuable to the creditor (e.g., where the nature of the property is relevant to the
creditor only to the extent that it is convertible into money or its equivalent, but where the debtor
does find its inherent qualities important)." Comment, Provisional Remedies in New York Reap-
praised Under Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. A Constitutional Fly in the Creditor's Ointment,
supra, at 431.
25. See note 24 supra.
26. See, e.g., Osmond v. Spence, 327 F. Supp. 1349 (D. Del. 1971); Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal.
3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971).
27. National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964).
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ing power.2 Furthermore, for an attempted waiver to be effective, it
must be clear that the party asserted to have contractually relinquished
his rights did so with full knowledge of those rights and the conse-
quences of his action; 29 in situations involving low-income consumers,
the likelihood is greatly increased that courts will find that a full under-
standing of the waiver provisions did not exist3 0 A few courts,3 how-
ever, disregarded this pro-consumer view of waiver and suggested that
the mere signing of a standard form contract that expressly authorizes
repossession effectively waives a debtor's rights to notice and a hearing,
whether or not the debtor is a low-income consumer.3 2 In the absence
of an authoritative Supreme Court ruling, however, post-Sniadach
decisions have left effectively unresolved the questions whether a presei-
zure notice and opportunity for a hearing are constitutionally required
for any or all types of property, and whether the due process safeguards
can be readily waived.
In the instant case the Court first examined the history of proce-
dural due process and found that a fair system of adjudication cannot
be achieved unless the disputing parties are afforded the opportunity to
be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. In creditor's
action cases, according to the Court, the right to be heard serves to
protect an individual from substantively unfair or mistaken deprivations
of property and, in order to fully effectuate this purpose, the right must
be granted before the deprivation occurs. The Court found that no other
safeguard f6r the debtor-such as posting bond prior to repossessing the
28. See, e.g., Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Comment, The
Growth of Procedural Due Process Into a New Substance: An Expanding Protection for Personal
Liberty and a "Specialized Type of Property. . . In Our Economic System," 66 Nw. U.L. REV.
502, 550 & n.218.
29. See D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972) (contractual waiver effective
because parties had equality of bargaining power and knowledge of consequences); cf Brookhart
v. Janis, 384 U.S. I (1966) (alleged waiver of right to cross-examine witnesses held ineffective);
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938)(no waiver of right to counsel); Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public
Util. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292 (1937)(no waiver of right to have property valued upon evidence).
30. See, e.g., Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1970), affd, 405 U.S. 191
(1972). See also Comment, Abolition of the Confession of Judgment Note in Retail Installment
Contracts in Pennsylvania, 73 DICK. L. REV. 115, 116 (1968).
31. See, e.g., McCormick v. First Nat'l Bank, 322 F. Supp. 604 (S.D. Fla. 1971); Lawson
v. Mantell, 306 N.Y.S.2d 317 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
32. The Court in Fuentes v. Faircloth, 317 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. Fla. 1970), vacated and
remanded sub noi. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), declared that whether the 2 contracting
parties were both commercial or whether one was a commercial party and the other a private
individual was a "distinction without a difference as far as Due Process is concerned." Id. at 957.
In Epps v. Cortese, 326 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1971), vacated and remanded, 407 U.S. 67 (1972),
dealing with an alleged waiver of fourth amendment rights, the court suggested in dictum that the




chattels-is as effective as a hearing in preventing the arbitrary depriva-
tion of property and that a temporary repossession pending final adjudi-
cation nonetheless constitutes a "deprivation" within the ambit of the
due process clause. Therefore, the Court concluded that due process
requires notice and an opportunity for a hearing before any property
may be seized. The Court, however, did recognize that the repossession
of property may constitutionally precede a hearing when an important
governmental or public interest is at stake, when a special need exists
for prompt action, or when a government official, pursuant to specific
statutory authority, determines that summary seizure is necessary. In
applying these principles to the instant case, the Court found that the
Florida and Pennsylvania replevin provisions did not provide for a pre-
seizure opportunity to be heard or confine their application to specified
extraordinary situations. Furthermore, although the appellants did not
have complete title to the goods in question, they did have a sufficient
interest, in the Court's view, to warrant the protection of the due process
clause. The Court stated that Sniadach's emphasis on the "necessity"
of wages to one's livelihood as a basis for requiring a hearing prior to
garnishment of wages did not mean that "unnecessary" property should
receive less protection under the fourteenth amendment, because the due
process clause, in both letter and spirit, encompasses all significant
property interests. Turning to the waiver issue, the Court stated that due
process rights may be contractually waived if the language of the con-
tract amounts to a waiver on its face and the waiver is voluntarily,
intelligently, and knowingly made. In the instant case, however, the
Court found that the waiver provisions of appellants' conditional sales
contracts constituted merely a statement of the sellers' rights to repos-
session and that appellants thus had not waived their constitutional
rights to a preseizure hearing.3 3 Therefore, since all significant prop-
erty interests, including those of appellants, are protected by the four-
teenth amendment, and since appellants had not waived their procedural
due process rights, the Court concluded that the state provisions allow-
ing the prejudgment replevy of chattels without prior hearing and an
opportunity to be heard deprived appellants of their property without
due process of law.
34
33. The Court recognized that there had been no bargaining over the contractual terms
between the parties who, in any event, were far from equal in bargaining power. The Court also
noted that the purported waiver provisions in the standard form contracts had been in relatively
fine print and that appellees had made no showing that appellants were aware of the significance
of the provisions. 407 U.S. at 95-96.
34. In his dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, Justice
White expressed his feeling that the invalidated provisions protected the interests of both creditor
and debtor. He declared that if there is a default, it is essential that the creditor be allowed to
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The Fuentes decision is significant for its holding that the four-
teenth amendment protects every significant property interest and not
just the "specialized" property enunciated in Sniadach; at least two
unresolved problems, however, leave the ultimate impact of the case
unclear. First, the decision's effect upon the constitutionality of the
creditor "self-help" provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code re-
mains to be seen. Section 9-503 provides: "Unless otherwise agreed a
secured party has on default the right to take possession of the collat-
eral. In taking possession a secured party may proceed without judicial
process if this can be done without breach of the peace or may proceed
by action." This provision thus permits a creditor either to reclaim
property without providing the possessor any procedural rights if the
state's agents are not used to obtain the goods, or to institute judicial
proceedings for repossession, in which case Fuentes now requires a
preseizure opportunity for hearing. This disparity in the availability of
procedural due process safeguards might be justified on the ground that
personal repossession or self-help provisions lack sufficient nexus with
the state to constitute state action, which is required for a violation of
the fourteenth amendment. 5 However, since the state creates the con-
tractual rights involved, and since the state statute condones the self-
help procedure, there would appear to be sufficient state action to in-
voke the protection of the fourteenth amendment." If a court were to
allow a creditor to deny the debtor procedural safeguards through self-
help, the scope of the Fuentes holding would be severely limited 7.3 Even
if state action is not found, the prophylactic purpose of the Fuentes
rationale nevertheless could be advanced by construing "default" a pre-
repossess; and if there is no default, then the debtor has an opportunity for a full hearing and may
recover damages if he prevails. 407 U.S. at 99.
35. U.S. CONST. amend, XIV, § 1. "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property .... " Id.
36. Comment, supra note 28, at 513-14. "Since private activities serving a public function
have been held to implicate the state in conduct proscribed by the fourteenth amendment. . . and
to have invaded first amendment rights . . . it would only constitute one further step to hold that
private activity avoiding any public agency's involvement, but aimed at disserving public interests
in the protection of constitutional rights, is imbued with sufficient state action." Id. at 512 n.42.
See Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972), in which the court declared §§ 9-503 and
9-504 unconstitutional. The court reasoned that, since the statutes embodied the policy of the state
and since the statutes had an impact on the provisions of the conditional sales contracts involved,
there was sufficient state action to invoke the protection of the due process clause. Cf Hall v.
Garson, 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970). In Hall, plaintiffs challenged a Texas statute that gave a
landlord a lien on personal property of a tenant and allowed seizure without opportunity for a
hearing. In deciding upon jurisdiction, the court found "state action" under Shelley v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1 (1948). But cf Young v. Ridley, 309 F. Supp. 1308 (D.D.C. 1970).
37. Cf Smith, Sniadach and Summary Procedures: The Constitution Comes to the Market-
place. 5 IND. LEGAL F. 300, 327 (1972).
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requisite for any repossession, as necessitating a judicial determina-
tion, rather than a creditor determination." In addition, any agree-
ment providing that the creditor should determine what constitutes de-
fault would be subject to attack on the grounds of disparity of bargain-
ing power 9 or unconscionability. 0 Under this approach, section 9-503
could be held to meet the dictates of Fuentes, and the necessity of
drafting a new statute could be avoided. 4' Therefore, whether the UCC
self-help provisions are declared unconstitutional as violative of the due
process clause, or whether they are construed to require judicial scrutiny
before any seizure takes place, the result is the same-the debtor must
be given an opportunity for a hearing before his property may be seized.
Given that the Fuentes rationale will reach the UCC's self-help
provisions, however, a second problem remains: the Court seems to have
disregarded several pragmatic implications of its decision that tend to
impose unreasonable burdens on creditors. Although the Court inti-
mated that notice and a hearing are not necessary prior to repossession
if a creditor can show the immediate danger of a debtor destroying or
concealing the disputed goods,42 it failed to give any guidelines on what
would constitute a sufficient showing of this danger. Since the proceed-
ing would be ex parte, would anything short of a notarized letter from
the debtor declaring his obstructive intentions be sufficient proof? Al-
though it has been suggested that the danger of concealment or damage
should not be a valid creditor contention,43 this view overlooks what
38. See Comment, Replevin: A Due Process Prescription For an Ancient Writ, 45 TEMP.
L.Q. 259, 276 (1972). The creditors in Fuentes could not have circumvented this requirement, even
though some of the debtors admitted default, because those admissions came after the summary
seizures. Consequently, the unconstitutional seizures occurred prior to an impartial determination
on whether there had been a default.
39. See Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284 (E. D. Pa. 1970) (lease providing for statu-
tory distress procedure held not waiver); cf. Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1970),
affd, 405 U.S. 191 (1972) (clause providing for confession of judgment held not waiver). See
generally Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43
COLUt,. L. REV. 629 (1943).
40. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302(1) provides: "If the court as a matter of law finds
the contract or any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the
court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without
the unconscionable clause, or it may limit the application of any conscionable clause as to avoid
any unconscionable result." See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d
69 (1960); cf. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). "Uncon-
scionability has generally been recognized to include an absence of meaningful choice on the part
of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other
party." Id. at 449.
41. See note 38 supra.
42. 407 U.S. at 93.
43. See Comment, supra note 38, at 265. Proponents of this view reason that, since the
creditor constantly is seeking payment of the debt prior to repossession, the debtor has already
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seems to be a realistic appraisal of the situation: when a defaulting
debtor receives notice of an action in which he will lose the goods, he
no longer has any incentive to protect them. Creditors, being unable to
protect their interests in the chattels prior to a hearing, may increase
the cost of credit to offset losses from missing or damaged goods and
expenses from the required judicial hearings.44 As a result, low-income
consumers, who utilize installment credit more than high-income con-
sumers45 and are marginal credit risks, may be unable to secure any
credit." Absent new legislation designed to prevent either a significant
increase in credit costs or reduction in credit extension, it would thus
appear that the practical results of Fuentes may negate its beneficial
consumer protection aspects.47 Furthermore, a creditor may attempt to
avoid the increased costs that Fuentes entails by securing the debtor's
waiver of due process rights in the contract. The Court did suggest that
if the contractual language is clear and amounts to a waiver on its face,
the waiver would be effective. Nevertheless, since the "courts indulge
every reasonable presumption against waiver,"4 and since the clause
would always be subject to the arguments of unconscionability and
disparity of bargaining power," it seems unlikely that creditors would
be able validly to incorporate such a provision into standard form con-
tracts. Ultimately, the loss of state replevin statutes and the UCC self-
help provisions, coupled with the practical difficulties in validly provid-
ing for contractual waiver, may impair significantly a creditor's ability
to protect his security interest in goods prior to the judicial hearing
required by Fuentes.
had ample opportunity to conceal or damage the property if he so intends.
44. Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614, 622 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
45. FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, ECONOIIC REPORT ON INSTALLMENT CREDIT AND RETAIL
SALES PRACTICES OF DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA RETAILERS IX (MARCH 1968).
46. Cf Comment, Laprease and Fuentes: Replevin Reconsidered, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 886,
904 (1971); Special Project, Wage Garnishment in Washington-An Empirical Study, 43 WASH.
L. REV. 743, 772-73 (1968). But see Comment, supra note 38, at 268.
47. For a general discussion concerning the low-income consumer see D. CAPLOVITZ, THE
POOR PAY MORE (1967).
48. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937).
49. See notes 39-40 supra.
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Constitutional Law-Right to Counsel-Absent Waiver,
No Defendant May Be Imprisoned Unless Represented
By Counsel At Trial
Without representation by counsel, petitioner, an indigent, was
convicted of a misdemeanor' punishable by imprisonment up to six
months and was sentenced to serve 90 days in jail. He subsequently
sought habeas corpus relief from the state supreme court alleging that
the state's failure to provide a court-appointed attorney contravened his
sixth amendment right to counsel. 2 In denying relief, that court adopted
the state's contention that petitioner had no right to counsel because the
sixth amendment's reach against the states was limited by the Supreme
Court's holding in Duncan v. Louisiana3 that the sixth amendment
right to trial by jury does not extend to persons accused of offenses
punishable by less than six months imprisonment.4 On writ of certiorari
to the United States Supreme Court, held, reversed. Absent a knowing
and intelligent waiver, no defendant may be imprisoned unless he was
represented by counsel at his trial. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25
(1972).
Judicial recognition of an indigent's right to counsel has emerged
in two separate lines of historical development-one federal, and the
other state. This right was first recognized to exist within the federal
system in 1938 with the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. Zerbst.I
The Court in Johnson held that, absent an intelligent waiver, an indigent
who is accused of a felony has an absolute right to counsel. Four years
later, the District of Columbia Circuit in Evans v. Rives' declared that
an indigent misdemeanant was entitled to court-appointed counsel, since
1. Petitioner was charged in Florida with carrying a concealed weapon, an offense punishable
by imprisonment up to 6 months and a $1,000 fine.
2. The sixth amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." Many state constitutions also
guarantee this right. E.g., GA. CONST. § 2-105. But cf FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 16 (an accused "[s]hall
have the right to . . . be heard in person, by counsel or both .... "). There was no evidence
presented to show that petitioner had waived his right to counsel. Since a waiver must be an
intentional relinquishment of a known right, Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), and since
every reasonable presumption is made against a waiver, Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275 (1941),
waiver could not have been implied.
3. 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (crime punishable by imprisonment up to 2 years made trial by jury
mandatory).
4. 236 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1970) (4-3 decision).
5. 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (accused convicted of counterfeiting Federal Reserve notes and
sentenced to 4 /2 years in the penitentiary).
6. 126 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (accused convicted of nonsupport of his minor child and
sentenced to one year in jail).
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the Constitution makes no distinction between loss of liberty for long
and short periods of time.7 Soon thereafter, the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure were promulgated; Rule 448 guaranteed representation to
the indigent regardless of the alleged offense. The Federal Criminal
Justice Act of 1964, however, modified Rule 44 to deprive petty offend-
ers of their prior statutory right to counsel In contrast to the relatively
simple federal development, recognition of an indigent's right to ap-
pointed counsel in state courts has been characterized by conflict and
inconsistency. In 1932, the Supreme Court, in Powell v. Alabama,"0 held
that when the defendant in a case involving capital punishment is unable
to employ counsel and is incapable of presenting his own defense, the
court must appoint counsel to meet the due process requirements of the
fourteenth amendment." Ten years later, the Court in Betts v. Brady,1
2
a noncapital felony case, established the "special circumstances" test.
The Court reasoned that, although due process might require appointed
counsel in some criminal proceedings, representation is not always nec-
essary to ensure a fair trial. Therefore, the Court concluded that the
necessity of appointing counsel should be determined on an ad hoc
basis. 3 The Betts test was expressly overruled in 1963 by the landmark
decision of Gideon v. Wainwright," in which petitioner, who was not
represented by counsel at trial, had been convicted of a felony. 5 The
Gideon Court, holding for the first time that the sixth amendment was
applicable to the states, 6 proclaimed the right to counsel to be funda-
7. Id. at 638.
8. Rule 44 was amended in 1966 as Rule 44(a), but the right to counsel provision was not
altered. FED. R. CRIM. P. 4, comment 1.
9. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(b) (1970). A petty offense is "[a]ny misdemeanor, the penalty for
which does not exceed imprisonment for a period of six months or a fine of not more than $500,
or both. ... 18 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). The legislative history shows Congress recognized that
indigents should have the right to counsel in all misdemeanor cases, but because of limited re-
sources reserved the right to the more serious charges. H.R. REP. No. 1209, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1964).
10. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
II. The fourteenth amendment provides: "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law .... By relying solely on the fourteenth amend-
ment, the Court by-passed any discussion of the sixth amendment and its applicability to the states.
12. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
13. The Court reasoned that the fourteenth amendment demands "fundamental fairness."
The trial court must weigh the "totality of facts" in order to determine if that right will be denied
when the accused is brought to trial without counsel. The Court believed that any "hard and fast
rules" would overlook the uniqueness of every criminal proceeding. Id. at 462.
14. 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (conviction without the aid of counsel in noncapital felony case).
15. The Court stated that Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), failed to follow the well-
considered reasoning of Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), which recognized the need for
counsel even for the intelligent and educated layman. Id. at 345.
16. The Court concluded that fundamental guarantees incorporated in the Bill of Rights
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mental and therefore applicable to "any person haled into court." On
the same day, the Court in Patterson v. Warden1 7 vacated an indigent's
misdemeanor conviction and remanded the case to the state court for
further consideration in light of Gideon. However, Mr. Justice Harlan,
in a concurring opinion, indicated that the Gideon rationale should be
confined to its factual context-trials of accused felons.18 In attempting
to implement the ambiguous Gideon holding, the states adopted a vari-
ety of standards for providing counsel to indigent misdemeanantsY'
Each jurisdiction, however, was able to justify its own standard under a
defensible interpretation of Gideon. First, California was the only state
to guarantee counsel in all criminal proceedings."0 Secondly, a minority
of states withheld counsel in all misdemeanor cases by restricting
Gideon to its facts.21 Thirdly, the majority of states took various inter-
mediate positions based on three basic rationales. Some states used a
discretionary test similar to that employed in Betts. z Other states
granted court-appointed counsel only to indigents eligible for jury
trial.23 The remaining states held that no convicted indigent could be
imprisoned unless he had been represented by counsel at trial. To com-
ply with this rule, these jurisdictions adopted either of the following
standards: providing counsel whenever incarceration is authorized for
the offense charged;2 4 or assigning counsel when imprisonment is not
apply not only to federal forums, but also to state proceedings through the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment. The Court used the same rationale employed in making the first,
fourth, fifth, and eighth amendments applicable to the states. Id. at 339-44.
17. 372 U.S. 776 (1963).
18. "Whether.the rule should be applied to all criminal cases need not now be decided." 372
U.S. at 351.
19. See generally Junker, The Right to Counsel in Misdemeanor .Cases, 43 WASH. L. REv.
685, 719-22 (1968).
20. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 13; see In re Johnson, 62 Cal. 2d 325, 398 P.2d 420,42 Cal. Rptr.
228 (1965); CAL. PEN. CODE § 859 (West Supp. 1972) ("If the defendant desires and is unable to
employ counsel, the court shall assign counsel to defend him.").
21. E.g., Watkins v. Morris, 179 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 1965) (accused not entitled to counsel for
traffic violation, a misdemeanor); Fish v. State, 159 So. 2d 866 (Fla. 1964) (accused misdemeanant
not entitled to counsel). The Florida Supreme Court in the instant case refused to grant petitioner
counsel under the Fish doctrine. Contra, Brinson v. Florida, 273 F. Supp. 840 (S.D. Fla. 1967).
The Florida Supreme Court in Watkins v. Morris, a post-Gideon case, expressly refused to grant
misdemeanants counsel until the necessity should have been "authoritatively determined" by the
Supreme Court of the United States. 179 So. 2d at 349.
22. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-21-3 (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-81(a)
(1958). The criteria to be used for granting right to counsel have not been clearly enunciated by
either statute or court opinion. Junker, supra note 19, at 727.
23. This test is also called the "6-month rule" and is equivalent to the criteria of the Federal
Criminal Justice Act of 1964. In the instant case, the Florida Supreme Court analogized to Duncan
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), in picking a 6-month cut-off. 236 So. 2d at 443. But cf. Junker,
supra note 19, at 707.
24. E.g., State v. Borst, 228 Minn. 388, 154 N.W.2d 888 (1967); In re Stevenson, 254 Ore.
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only authorized but is likely to be imposed.2 Therefore, prior to the
instant decision, lack of uniformity characterized the states' recognition
of an indigent's sixth amendment right to counsel; depending on the
state, indigent misdemeanants, charged with the same offense, might be
guaranteed court appointed counsel or no counsel at all. 6
In the instant case, the Court first reviewed previous sixth amend-
ment cases27 and concluded that conditioning the availability of rights
upon the seriousness of the offense has a valid historical basis only for
the right to trial by jury.21 Turning to an examination of the previous
right to counsel cases, the Court noted that Powell v. Alabama
emphasized the extreme disadvantages an accused often faces when
taken to trial without counsel.2 1 Moreover, the Court noted that Gideon
emphasized that representation is necessary to ensure a fair trial."0 The
Court explained that, although Powell and Gideon involved felons, their
reasoning was equally applicable to lesser offenders. The Court also
asserted that the trials of petty offenders often "bristle" with complex
legal issues, that plea decisions can be critically important in criminal
cases, 31 and that the enormous volume of misdemeanor cases can re-
duce due process safeguards to "assembly-line justice." Relying on the
94, 458 P.2d 414 (1969); 19 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 367 (1968).
25. Accord, ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Standards
Relating to Providing Defense Services § 4.1 (1968). "Counsel should be provided in all criminal
proceedings for offenses punishable by loss of liberty, except those types of offenses for which such
punishment is not likely to be imposed, regardless of their denomination as felonies, misdemeanors
or otherwise." Id. Two methods based on the likelihood of incarceration have been used for
deciding if counsel should be assigned: an analysis of the particular case, a Betts approach, or an
analysis and elimination of those classes of cases that rarely carry jail sentences, although such
sentences are authorized by statute. Junker, supra note 19, at 709. With the exception of California,
all states have attempted to limit the assignment of counsel in some manner in order to avoid the
great expense of providing every indigent accused with free legal services. E.g., City of Toledo v.
Frazier, 10 Ohio App. 2d 51, 59, 226 N.E.2d 777, 782 (1967).
26. In spite of this confusion, the Supreme Court declined to clarify the scope of its Gideon
holding. Winters v. Beck, 239 Ark. 1151,397 S.W.2d 364 (1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 907 (1966);
DeJoseph v. Connecticut, 3 Conn. Cir. 624, 222 A.2d 752, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 982 (1966).
27. The specific rights dealt with in the cases reviewed by the Court include the right to a
public trial, to be informed of the charge, to confront witnesses, and to compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses.
28. The right to jury trial is for historical reasons limited to offenses punishable by more
than 6 months imprisonment. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970); Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145 (1968).
29. 297 U.S. at 68-69. Disadvantages cited by the Court include ignorance of the science of
law, inability to determine the validity of an indictment, and unfamiliarity with the rules of
evidence.
30. 372 U.S. at 344.
31. The Court believed that counsel should be present when an accused pleads guilty in order
to ensure that he understands the significance and consequences which may result from the plea
and that he is treated fairly by the prosecution.
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sixth amendment, the Court then concluded that, absent a valid
waiver,3 no person may be imprisoned unless represented by counsel
at his trial.
3
In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Powell34 challenged the ma-
jority opinion on both constitutional and practical grounds. He rejected
the no-counsel, no-prison mandate, arguing that it fails to consider
criminal sanctions such as fines35 or other nonimprisonment penalties
36
that involve deprivation of property rights and could produce conse-
quences as serious as imprisonment. As an alternative, Mr. Justice
Powell recommended a three-fold test to determine the need for coun-
selY.3 By weighing the complexity of the offense, the probable sentence
to be imposed, and the individual factors of the specific case, Justice
Powell suggested that a court could determine whether or not counsel
should be appointed; he explained that this methodology would avoid
the pitfalls that he believed to be inherent in the majority opinion-the
need for a time-consuming pretrial investigation to determine whether
imprisonment may be ordered, the subsequent limitation on sentencing
if counsel is not appointed, the burdens on state resources by increasing
the use of court-appointed counsel, and the resulting delays which will
tax an already overburdened court system. Mr. Justice Powell reasoned
that this standard fulfills constitutional due process requirements and
guarantees fairness at trial.
38
Although the instant decision promises to guarantee greater fair-
ness at trial and to foster long-range reform of the criminal system, it
initially presents serious constitutional and practical questions. First,
the sixth amendment does not condition the right to counsel upon dis-
tinctions between penalties that entail deprivation of liberty and penal-
ties that entail deprivation of property; further, the due process clause,
through which the sixth amendment is made applicable to the states,39
includes protection of property rights as well as life and liberty. The
32. Although the Court did not discuss the criteria for a valid waiver, these requirements
have been outlined in other Supreme Court cases. See note 2 supra.
33. Chief Justice Burger in his concurring opinion briefly explained how the new rule might
be applied. He recommended that the trial judge make a pretrial "predictive evaluation" based on
the special circumstances to determine whether counsel should be appointed. See note 25 supra.
34. Mr. Justice Rehnquist joined in the concurring opinion.
35. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment applies to life, liberty, and property
but makes no distinctions among them.
36. For example, loss of one's drivers license.
37. Although Mr. Justice Powell did not mention Betts v. Brady, his test is similar in
approach to the Betts rationale.
38. "Due Process . . . embodies principles of fairness rather than immutable line drawing
." 407 U.S. at 49.
39. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); see note 16 supra.
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majority, however, fails to discuss any rationale that would justify re-
quiring counsel for those accused facing imprisonment while denying
counsel to those facing fines." In Fuentes v. Shevin,4' decided on the
same day as the instant case, the Court held that any deprivation of a
significant property interest requires due process of law under the four-
teenth amendment. The two cases might be distinguishable on their facts
and their reliance on different amendments, but their common emphasis
on fairness and procedural due process would seem to make the diver-
gent holdings significantly inconsistent. Secondly, the Court's decision
raises a constitutional question of equal protection for the solvent ac-
cused. If an indigent is convicted without counsel and has not waived
representation, the court must limit the sentence to a fine. A solvent
accused, however, will be subjected to the full range of criminal sanc-
tions whether he has legal assistance or not. Apparently the Court
equates the solvent accused's failure to retain counsel with a valid
waiver.4" Hence the range of possible sanctions is predicated upon the
questionable distinction of wealth. Moreover, since indigents have the
right to court-appointed counsel during interrogation under Miranda v.
Arizona,43 does Argersinger imply that a failure to provide representa-
tion to an indigent at this stage of the criminal proceeding precludes a
subsequent prison sentence? In addition, the Argersinger holding raises
the question of its alplicability to the military court-martial.44 Aside
from these constitutional questions, the instant holding promises to
present serious problems in its practical implementation. Since present
resources are inadequate to provide all misdemeanants with counsel,,
courts will be forced to select the misdemeanants who are to receive
counsel. This process will involve additional pretrial investigation, and
will force a judge to decide if counsel should be appointed before he has
heard all the relevant facts and testimony.46 Since many indigent misde-
meanants will not face jail sentences simply because no counsel will be
available, the legislative design and deterrent effect of imprisonment will
40. Justice Douglas dismissed the issue when he stated, "We need not consider the require-
ments of the Sixth Amendment as regards the right to counsel where loss of liberty is not involved,
however, for here, petitioner was in fact sentenced to jail." 407 U.S. at 37.
41. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
42. This conclusion is implicit in the instant decision, since an accused who fails to qualify
as an indigent has 2 choices: hire private counsel or proceed to trial without a lawyer.
43. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
44. The district court of Hawaii held that Argersinger is binding in court-martial proceed-
ings. Daigle v. Warner, 41 U.S.L.W. 2161 (D. Hawaii Aug. 31, 1972) (serviceman entitled to
counsel in summary court-martial where sentenced to one month incarceration).
45. See Comment, 23 U. FLA. L. REv. 428 (1971).
46. Junker, supra note 19, at 709.
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be greatly reduced. In addition, under the Court's recent decision in
Tate v. Short,47 which invalidated "dollar-a-day" statutes, fines may
also lose their punitive effect, since an accused who qualifies as an
indigent under state law will probably be too impecunious to pay a
fine. 8 Consequently, if the court fails to appoint counsel for an indigent,
the judge may have no effective sanction to impose. The instant decision
thus will require significant increases in the availability of defense coun-
sel if the prison sentence is to function as an effective sanction.4 1 Studies
have shown, however, that providing counsel for all accused indigents
will be feasible only if the number of law school graduates is increased,
more paraprofessionals are used, and funding for legal aid and public
defender programs is expanded." But, in spite of these short-term prob-
lems, Argersinger should produce long-range benefits to the judicial
system. To provide counsel on such an increased scale, more efficient
and innovative methods for handling criminal cases will be required.5'
The instant decision should encourage courts to experiment with new
judicial techniques for treating misdemeanants and should spur legisla-
tures to appropriate more funds.5 2 Finally, requiring counsel for misde-
meanants may precipitate new reforms similar to those which the public
defender and legal aid programs initiated in the aftermath of Gideon.53
Should the burden on state financial and human resources become over-
whelming, the instant decision could produce a major restructuring of
the criminal system. One authority54 has suggested that certain crimes
now classified as misdemeanors or petty offenses should be completely
abolished 55-thus freeing state courts and law enforcement agencies to
concentrate on more serious criminal offenses.5" Although extreme, this
47. 401 U.S. 395 (1971) (indigent may not be incarcerated for inability to pay fine).
48. This conclusion, of course, depends on the state's definition of "indigent."
49. See Report of the Conference on Legal Manpower Needs of Criminal Law, 41 F.R.D.
389 (1966).
50. Allison & Phelps, Can We Afford to Provide Trial Counsel for the Indigent in Misde-
meanor Cases?, 13 WM. & MARY L. REv. 75, 83-94 (1971). For a discussion of costs see Note,
Dollars and Sense of an Expanded Right to Counsel, 55 IOWA L. REv. 1249, 1259-64 (1970).
51. See Note, supra note 50, at 1266-67.
52. Id. at 1267.
53. See Allison & Phelps, supra note 50, at 84-85; Silverstein, The Continuing Impact of
Gideon v. Wainwright on the States, 51 A.B.A.J. 1023 (1965); Graham, A Lawyer Now For All
Who Risk Jail, N.Y. Times, June 18, 1972, § 4, at 6.
54. N. MORRIS & G. HAWKINS, THE HONEST POLITICIAN'S GUIDE TO CRIIE CONTROL
(1970).
55. Included in this category might be drunkenness, drug abuse, gambling, disorderly con-
duct and vagrancy, abortion, deviant sexual behavior, and some forms of juvenile delinquency. Id.
at 3.
56. Id. at 2. The authors contend that the criminal law is poorly designed to enforce private




suggestion illustrates the crisis regarding the treatment of lesser offenses
that the states will experience subsequent to Argersinger unless their
legislatures provide significant and innovative reforms:
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-Class Actions-Class
Action Alleging Similar Injury by Separate Defendants
Who Acted Similarly but Independently Allowed Under
Rule 23(b)(3)
Plaintiff brought a class action in federal district court on behalf
of all persons who had borrowed from several Oregon pawnbrokers
during a six-month period, alleging that each defendant had committed
similar' violations of the Truth in Lending Act.2 Plaintiff, who had dealt
with only one of the defendants, claimed that questions common to the
class predominated over questions that affected only individual class
members, that a class action was superior to other available methods
of adjudicating the controversy, and, consequently, that the action
should be allowed as a class suit under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendants contended that the group plaintiff
claimed to represent did not constitute a single class, but rather was
composed of several classes, each comprising those persons who had
borrowed from each defendant, and that plaintiff therefore could not
represent those persons who had borrowed from other defendants. On
defendants' motion to dismiss, the United States District Court for the
District of Oregon, held, motion denied. In a class action under Rule
23(b)(3), a representative plaintiff may sue multiple defendants on be-
half of a class all of whose members allege similar injury as the result
of independent acts by separate defendants. LaMar v. H & B Novelty
& Loan Co., 55 F.R.D. 22 (D. Ore. 1972).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended in 1966, grant
the federal courts broad power to settle multiparty claims in a single
action. The rules that control class actions3 and joinder of parties4 de-
I. Defendants were charged with failure to disclose the total amount to be financed and the
amount of the finance charge expressed in an annual percentage rate. LaMar v. H & B Novelty
& Loan Co., 55 F.R.D. 22 (D. Ore. 1972).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-13, 1631-44, 1661-65 (1970). The purpose of the Act is to protect
consumers against unfair billing practices by requiring full disclosure of finance charges. The Act
imposes a statutory penalty of not less than $100 per violation.
3. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
4. FED. R. Civ. P. 19-20.
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emphasize formal procedural requirements5 but provide general guide-
lines, allowing courts to examine the practical considerations of individ-
ual cases' to determine whether the amalgamation of disputes will pro-
mote judicial economy and avoid prejudice to the parties.7 Rule 23(a)
establishes four requirements for any class action: the class must be so
numerous that joinder is impracticable; there must be common ques-
tions of law or fact; the claims or defenses of the representative party
must be typical of those held by the rest of the class; and the representa-
tive party must fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
Rule 23(b)(3), which was intended to facilitate damages actions for
which class treatment is desirable and convenient but not essential,8
imposes two further conditions: the common questions must predomi-
nate, and the class action must be superior to other methods of adjudica-
tion. The decisions reflect a judicial view that the class action require-
ments possess considerable flexibility. A class action involving a class
numbering as few as thirteen members has been upheld;9 and although
the class must be defined with some precision, 0 exact numbers need not
be specified." Courts have held that representative plaintiffs who claim
5. Former Rule 23, which took effect in 1938, made a tripartite division of the situations in
which class actions were allowed. The 3 categories, "true," "hybrid," and "spurious," became
obscure and uncertain. The restrictions prevented a suit that could not be pigeonholed but that
was otherwise amenable to class treatment from being maintained as a class action. Z. CHAFFEE,
SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 244-49 (1950); 3B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 23.01 [8], at 23-
22 (2d ed. 1969).
6. "[T]he district judge, unhampered by traditional classifications, is given a large measure
of discretion in balancing conflicting interests." Cohn, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
54 GEo. L.J. 1204, 1214 (1966).
7. Cohn, supra note 6, at 1204; Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 23(b)(3), 39 F.R.D. 98,
102-03 (1966).
8. The Advisory Committee described the circumstances in which a class action under Rule
23(b)(3) is appropriate as follows: "In the situations to which this subdivision relates, class-action
treatment is not as clearly called for as in those described above [cases under Rule 23(b)(l)-(2)],
but it may nevertheless be convenient and desirable depending upon the particular facts. Subdivi-
sion (b)(3) encompasses those cases in which a class action would achieve economies of time, effort,
and expense, and promote uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated, without sacrific-
ing procedural fairness or bringing about other undesirable results." Advisory Committee Note,
supra note 7.
9. Dale Electronics, Inc. v. R.C.L. Electronics, Inc., 53 F.R.D. 531 (D.N.H. 1971) (patent
infringement case in which class of 13 defendants was permitted because their locations in different
parts of the country made joinder not only impractical, but impossible). A class action in which
class members numbered no more than 5 was not allowed. Bonner v. Texas City Independent
School Dist., 305 F. Supp. 600 (S.D. Tex. 1969). "For the class to be large enough to permit a
class suit, impossibility of joinder is not required. . . . [I]t is clear that no numerical test is
possible." C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 308 (2d ed. 1970).
10. Classes designated "Indo-Hispano, also called Mexican-American and Spanish-
American" and "poor" held too vague to define the class properly. Lopez Tijerina v. Henry, 48
F.R.D. 274 (D.N.M. 1969), appeal dismissed, 398 U.S. 922 (1970).
11. Fischer v. Kletz, 41 F.R.D. 377, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (stock fraud case; held, "[T]he
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damages different from those of other class members, 2 or allege reli-
ance on a prospectus different from those relied on by other class mem-
bers,' 3 satisfy the requirement of typical claims. 4 Although the ade-
quate representation requirement prohibits a class action when the inter-
ests of class members are adverse, 5 inadequate representation alone
does not compel dismissal; courts may realign a class to avoid adver-
sity " or permit representation to be strengthened by the addition of
supplemental parties. 17 Courts have held that the requirement that a
class action be superior to other methods of adjudication is satistifed in
cases for which class treatment is useful only in preliminary stages of
the litigation." The flexibility of Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(3) is best mani-
fested by the manner in which the courts have resolved the issue whether
common questions of law or fact exist and predominate. To determine
whether common questions predominate, courts often must undertake
to assess considerations of judicial economy.19 When, for example, sepa-
rate proofs by each class member are necessary to assure adequate
representation of his interests, and substantial judicial diseconomies
therefore result, courts have denied class action treatment, reasoning
that individual questions predominate over common ones.21 Upon a
failure to state the exact number in the class does not preclude the maintenance of a class action.")
12. Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559, 566-67 (D. Minn. 1968) (anti-
trust class action; plaintiff's claims held "typical" despite "substantially different damages" sus-
tained by members of plaintiff class).
13. In a securities fraud case the court construed Rule 23 very broadly, holding representa-
tive plaintiff's claims "typical" although he had relied entirely on the third prospectus issued by
defendant and other members of plaintiff class had relied on defendant's first and second prospec-
tuses. Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969).
14. Professor Moore criticizes this requirement, concluding, "IT]here is no need for this
clause, since all meanings attributable to it duplicate requirements prescribed by other provisions
in Rule 23." 3B J. MOORE, supra note 5, 23.06-2, 23-325.
15. City of Chicago v. General Motors Corp., 332 F. Supp. 285, 288 (N.D. I11. 1971) (action
on behalf of Chicago residents to enjoin sale of defendants' automobiles unless equipped with
pollution control devices not allowed; plaintiff could not adequately represent the class because
some members would be adversely affected by the relief sought).
16. Sol S. Turnoff Drug Distrib., Inc. v. N.V. Nederlandsche Combinatie Voor Chemische
Industrie, 51 F.R.D. 227, 233 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (power of court under Rule 23(c)(4)(B) to divide
class into subclasses justified maintenance of class action; class may be subdivided at later stage
of proceedings if interests become adverse).
17. The Advisory Committee stated, "[T]he court may rule. . . that a class action may be
maintained only if the representation is improved through intervention of additional parties of a
stated type." Advisory Committee Note, supra note 7, at 104.
18. Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 301 (2d Cir. 1968).
19. See Note, Revised Federal Rule 23, Class Actions: Surviving Difficulties and New
Problems Require Further Amendment, 52 MINN. L. REv. 509, 530 (1967). "[T]here seems to be
a continuum upon which the courts will draw a line at some point when the disunity of the class
exceeds these factors which unify it." Id. at 514.
20. Purdes v. Carvel Hall, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 1256, 1259 (S.D. Iowa 1969) (predominance
of common questions doubtful because proof required extensive evidence from each class member).
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determination that the adjudication of common questions would save
time and expense, 21 common questions are deemed predominant, even
if individual questions must be resolved later in separate trials.2 2 In class
actions against multiple defendants, an allegation that a conspiracy or
a common course of action by defendants injured each member of the
plaintiff class has been held to satisfy the common question require-
ment. 23 The necessity of an allegation that defendants' concerted action
injured each plaintiff, although not a requirement of Rule 23, is appar-
ent from the requirements for joinder of parties under the Federal
Rules. For proper joinder of multiple defendants, Rule 20(a) requires
not only that a common question exist, but also that any right to relief
arise from the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or
occurrences. 4 Paralleling their approach to the Rule 23 requirements,
the courts have afforded the Rule 20(a) series of transactions require-
ment a liberal construction. In United States v. Mississippi,2 defendant
voting registrars contended that joinder of defendants was improper
because their alleged offenses were separate torts against separate mem-
bers of plaintiff class. The Supreme Court allowed the class action,
holding that plaintiffs' allegation that defendants had acted as part of a
state-wide system of discriminatory voter registration was sufficient to
meet the requirement of a series of transactions.26 In a proper case,
plaintiffs may avoid the difficulty of meeting Rule 20 joinder conditions
by bringing suit against defendants as a classy.2 Although this device has
proved useful in patent infringement cases under Rule 23(b)(1) 28 and
actions for declaratory and injunctive relief under Rule 23(b)(2),29 the
device is impractical for Rule 23(b)(3) actions because defendants may
voluntarily remove themselves from the class."0 Rule 23(c)(2)-(3) pro-
21. Rogers v. Coburn Fin. Corp., 53 F.R.D. 182, 183 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (class treatment in
Truth in Lending Act case not permitted because "[cilearly no economy whatever would be gained
. . . since the court would still be required to physically examine several thousand disclosure
statements ....").
22. E.g., Weiss v. Tenney Corp., 47 F.R.D. 283 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (securities fraud); Siegel
v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 722 (N.D. Cal. 1967) (antitrust).
23. E.g., Morris v. Burchard, 51 F.R.D. 530, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (securities fraud); Siegel
v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 722 (N.D. Cal. 1967) (antitrust).
24. FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a).
25. 380 U.S. 128 (1965).
26. Id. at 142-43.
27. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a): "One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as
representative parties on behalf of all .... " (emphasis added).
28. Dale Electronics, Inc. v. R.C.L. Electronics, Inc., 53 F.R.D. 531 (D.N.H. 1971); Techno-
graph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Methode Electronics, Inc., 285 F. Supp. 714 (N.D. III. 1968).
29. Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hospital Unit 1, 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash.
1967), affd mem., 390 U.S. 598 (1968).
30. Benzoni v. Greve, 54 F.R.D. 450,455 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (securities fraud case; one reason
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vides that a judgment in an action under subdivision (b)(1) or (b)(2)
binds all whom the court finds to be members of the class; in a (b)(3)
action, prospective members may request exclusion from the class and
thereby avoid the effect of a judgment. The maximum reach of a permis-
sible class action against multiple defendants under Rule 23(b)(3) is
illustrated by Contract Buyers League v. F & F Investment." In that
case, plaintiffs, a class of black home buyers, brought suit against defen-
dant sellers, alleging numerous illegalities in connection with the sale of
used residential property. Denying defendants' contention that the suit
was not a proper class action because it consisted of "separate claims
by separate plaintiffs against separate defendants and requiring separate
proofs,' 3 the court allowed the class action to stand. The court found
that, although individual questions would remain, the allegation of con-
certed action by defendants in similarly unconscionable circumstances
constituted a predominant common question. On the basis of its finding
that each unfair contract was the result of a greater scheme of exploita-
tion created by the other unfair contracts and the system of "blockbust-
ing" in which all the defendants participated, the court concluded that
defendants had acted in concert.3 3 Courts consistently have held that
an allegation of defendants' concerted action is necessary for plaintiff
class to maintain an action against multiple defendants. 4
In the instant case, the court indicated two reasons for its reluct-
ance to dismiss the action. First, it emphasized that Rule 23 should be
construed broadly to afford effective relief for small claimants, espe-
cially the poor and the ignorant, and to prevent windfall immunities for
law violators. Secondly, the court noted that many borrowers would be
barred from relief by the statute of limitations if the instant class action
for court's refusal to order the establishment of two defendant subclasses was that "many [of the
defendants] would probably opt out of the class if it were established").
31. 48 F.R.D. 7 (N.D. III. 1969) (decision on issue whether suit could be maintained as a
class action). For decision on defendants' motions to dismiss for insufficiency of the claims see
300 F. Supp. 210 (N.D. Ill. 1969), affd sub nom. Baker v. F & F Investment, 420 F.2d 1191 (7th
Cir. 1970).
32. 48 F.R.D. at 10.
33. Id. at 10-12.
34. In a case decided the month before the instant case, a Missouri district court allowed
plaintiff class, composed of persons who had bought "lifetime memberships" in a health club, to
maintain a class action under the Truth in Lending Act against the 4 finance companies that had
bought the notes executed by plaintiffs to the health club. The facts are similar to the instant case,
in that separate members of plaintiff class alleged injury from separate defendants. Although no
allegation of concerted action by defendants was mentioned in the opinion, the fact that all
defendants used the same forms and extended credit through the health club as a conduit makes a
common course of conduct among defendants apparent. Joseph v. Norman's Health Club, Inc.,
336 F. Supp. 307 (E.D. Mo. 1971).
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were dismissed." The court first considered whether the requirements
of Rule 23(a) had been met. After listing the requirements, the court
found that each had been satisfied. Without discussing reasons for its
findings, the court stated the following conclusions: first, 33,000 bor-
rowers represented a class too numerous to join; secondly, the issue
whether the Truth in Lending Act applies to pawnbrokers was a com-
mon question; thirdly, despite plaintiffs failure to allege personal injury
by each defendant, the similarity of the injuries made his claims typical
of the class; and, finally, plaintiff, as a member of the class, would
adequately represent its interests. Turning to the additional require-
ments of Rule 23(b)(3), the court concluded, again without explanation,
that the size of the class rendered a class action the superior means of
adjudicating the controversy. Although recognizing that other courts
had allowed class actions only against multiple defendants acting in
concert, the court found nothing in Rule 23 or prior case law3" to
indicate that the common question requirement cannot be satisfied when
multiple defendants act independently. It reasoned that defendants' al-
leged violation of the same law in the same way, giving rise to the same
statutory relief, created a common question of law predominating over
questions affecting individual members. Holding that all the require-
ments of Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(3) therefore had been satisfied, and with-
out mentioning the joinder provisions of Rule 20(a), the court denied
defendants' motion to dismiss the suit as a class action.
The instant decision may have a beneficial impact in some situa-
tions, but the court's analysis is questionable. The decision, as applied
to the Truth in Lending Act and other federal consumer protection
legislation, 37 undeniably could have far-reaching consequences. By
allowing one plaintiff, as a private attorney general, to maintain an
action against numerous members of an industry when a common pat-
tern of wrongful conduct can be shown, the instant decision strengthens
35. It is not clear under what circumstances the statute of limitations is tolled for class
actions that are dismissed. See J. MOORE, supra note 5,9 23.9[3] at 23-1651 to -1654. See generally
Comment, Class Actions Under New Rule 23 and Federal Statutes of Limitation: A Study of
Conflicting Rationale, 13 VILL. L. REV. 370 (1968).
36. See cases cited notes 23 & 31 supra.
37. For a discussion of 3 consumer protection bills now pending in Congress and the benefi-
cial effects of enforcement by class actions see Newberg, Federal Consumer Class Action Legisla-
tion: Making the System Work, 9 HARV. J. LEGIS. 217 (1972). For another point of view see
Millstein, Federal Consumer Protection-Are Class Suits an Answer?, 26 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A.
664 (1971).
38. The need for improved protection of consumers is demonstrated by the Kerner Commis-
sion Report, which shows unfair credit practices and consumer sales as one of the 12 major sources




the enforcement power of consumer protection legislation. Additionally,
the decision meets the objections of large companies that consumer
protection legislation is enforced only against major, affluent members
of an industry.39 The decision makes practical consumer actions against
groups of small companies that, separately, are effectively judgment-
proof. The court's failure, however, to question whether defendants were
properly before the court under the joinder provisions of Rule 20(a)40 is
the primary defect of the decision. Plaintiffs' complaint, by alleging
independent wrongful acts by defendants that injured members of plain-
tiff class separately, fails to state a right to relief arising from the same
series of transactions. That the Rule 20(a) restriction is not simply
formalistic but is necessary to the orderly process of judicial administra-
tion may be illustrated by examples of actions that are clearly prohibited
by the series of transactions requirement but might be brought if it were
abandoned. A logical application of the rationale of the instant decision
would permit a class action by shareholders of many different corpora-
tions if the plaintiffs allege that each corporation, acting independently,
violated the same securities laws in the same way by issuing misleading
prospectuses. The rationale of the decision also might allow a class suit
by all whiplash victims against the negligent drivers who hit the cars
plaintiffs were driving. The development of a rationale that ignores Rule
20 and supports anomalous consequences, however, does not seem nec-
essary to reach salutary effects on the enforcement of consumer protec-
tion legislation. If plaintiffs can establish that substantially all Oregon
pawnbrokers use forms that violate the Truth in Lending Act by failing
to disclose the cost of credit, he can show that industry-wide use of the
same form prevented any member of the class from turning to a compet-
itor to obtain a fairer bargain." Plaintiff could then invoke the rationale
of the court in Contract Buyers League42 that each particular unfair
credit contract depended upon a series of discriminatory transac-
tions-the execution of unfair credit contracts by other defendants-to
support his contention that defendants' actions pursuant to an industry-
wide practice constituted concerted action that resulted in injury to each
member of the plaintiff class. The allegation of such concerted action
should meet the series of transactions requirement of Rule 20(a) as
construed by the Supreme Court in United States v. Mississippi
3
39. Newberg, supra note 37, at 225; Note, Class Actions Under the Truth-in-Lending Act,
47 NOaRE DAME LAWYER 1305, 1316 (1972).
40. The point is not raised in defendants' appeal brief. Brief for Appellants, LaMar v.
H & W Novelty & Loan Co., Civil No. 72-1485 (9th Cir. 1972).
41. This argument is forcefully made by the court in the landmark case of Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
42. 48 F.R.D. 7 (N.D. 11. 1969).
43. 380 U.S. 128 (1965).
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Securities Regulation-Securities Act of 1933-Access
Of All Offerees To Additional Desired Information Re-
quired For Section 4(2) Private Offering Exemption
Pursuant to section 20(b) of the Securities Act of 1933,1 the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission sought a permanent injunction to halt
the sale of unregistered securities by defendant Continental Tobacco
Company in violation of sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the Act.' Defendant
argued that its common stock offering to 38 persons, including 35 ulti-
mate purchasers, most of whom signed investment letters acknowledg-
ing receipt of defendant's prospectus, personal contact with its counsel
and officers, and access to all requested company records, was a private
offering entitled to the section 4(2) nonpublic offering exemption 3 from
the Act's registration requirements. 4 In denying injunctive relief, the
1. Securities Act of 1933, § 20(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1970). Failure to comply with the
registration provisions of§ 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 may result in civil liability under § 12(l),
15 U.S.C. § 771(l) (1970); criminal liability under § 24, 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1970); or an injunctive
action under § 20(b).
2. Securities Act of 1933, §§ 5(a), (c), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e(a), (c) (1970), provides:
"(a) Unless a registration statement is in effect as to a security, it shall be unlawful for
any person, directly or indirectly-
(1) to make use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in
interstate commerce or of the mails to sell such security through the use or medium of any
prospectus or otherwise; or
(2) to carry or cause to be carried through the mails or in interstate commerce, by any
means or instruments of transportation, any such security for the purpose of sale or for
delivery after sale.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to make use of any means
or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails to
offer to sell or offer to buy through the use or medium of any prospectus or otherwise any
security, unless a registration statement has been filed as to such security, or while the
registration statement is the subject of a refusal order or stop order or (prior to the effective
date of the registration statement) any public proceeding or examination under section 77h
of this title."
A preliminary injunction issued against Continental in 1967 for the violation of §§ 5(a)
and 5(c) had led to the dissolution and subsequent reorganization of the company's manage-
ment. The instant proceeding concerned the efforts of the new directors to refinance the
company in 1969 and 1970.
3. Securities Act of 1933, § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1970), provides: "The provisions of
section 77e [§ 5] of this title shall not apply to-... (2) transactions by an issuer not involving
any public offering."
4. The offerings were made at several presentations in private homes and in hotels in Fort
Lauderdale, Florida, and Baltimore, Maryland. The offerees included the family, friends, and
business associates of holders of the illegal 1967 Continental offering. At least one purchaser was
told that although the company was a speculative venture and offered no firm promises of profit,
stock was available to anyone who wanted to purchase it. Another purchaser, a dentist, openly
displayed the prospectus in his office and solicited as additional offerees his secretary, colleagues
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federal district court adopted defendant's contention as a matter of law.5
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
held, reversed and remanded. An issuer claiming the section 4(2) non-
public offering exemption from the Act's registration requirements must
explicitly prove that every offeree held a personal relationship with the
issuer through which the offeree had actual access to all information
concerning the company that he requested or required for making an
informed investment decision. SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co., 463
F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972).
Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933 to protect investors by
requiring the disclosure of information necessary for informed invest-
ment decisions.' Accordingly, section 5 of the Act requires the filing of
a registration statement detailing this necessary information for every
security offered or sold by an issuer, underwriter, or dealer through the
facilities of interstate commerce or the mails.7 Reflecting the congres-
and patients. At least 2 purchasers never had access to a prospectus, and 2 were given no opportun-
ity to meet with officers of the company prior to purchase. SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co., 326
F. Supp. 588 (S.D. Fla. 1971), rev'd, 463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972).
5. SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co., 326 F. Supp. 588 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
6. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124 (1953); A.C. Frost & Co. v. Coeur D'Alene
Mines Corp., 312 U.S. 38, 40 (1941); United States v. Custer Channel Wing Corp., 376 F.2d 675,
678 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 850, rehearing denied, 389 U.S. 998 (1967); Gilligan, Will &
Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461, 463 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 896 (1959). The preamble to the
Act sets forth this congressional intent: "An Act To provide full and fair disclosure of the character
of securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce and through the mails, and to prevent frauds
in the sale thereof, and for other purposes." 48 Stat. 74 (1933). President Roosevelt intended to
impose caveat vendor responsibility in the securities field, but with the "least possible interference
with honest business." Sargent, Private Offering Exemption, 21 Bus. LAW. 118 (1965).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970). Securities Act of 1933, § 4(l), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1970), further
exempts from the provisions of § 77e "transactions by any person other than an issuer, underwri-
ter, or dealer." Section 3 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77c (1970), offers additional exemptions for
certain classes of securities.
The registration statement, Securities Act of 1933, § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 77g (1970), and attending
prospectus, Securities Act of 1933, § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 77j (1970), require the following information
as specified in Securities Act of 1933, Schedule A, 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (1970): the nature and
character of the issuer's business; its capital structure; the remuneration to be paid to the issuer's
directors and to its officers and other employees, and the nature and extent of their interest in any
property acquired; an estimate of the net proceeds to be derived from the security offered; the
amounts, itemized in "reasonable" detail, of expenses incurred in connection with the sale of the
security; a detailed balance sheet of the assets and liabilities of the issuer certified by an indepen-
dent public or certified accountant; the profit and loss statement of the issuer, showing earnings
and income; the namis and addresses and a copy of the opinions of counsel who have passed on
the legality of the issue; and a copy of the issuer's articles of incorporation and of its by-laws.
United States v. Custer Channel Wing Corp., 376 F.2d 675, 678 n.2 (4th Cir. 1967); Sargent,
Pledges and Foreclosure Rights Under the Securities Act of 1933, 45 VA. L. REv. 885, 886 (1959).
Pursuant to Securities Act of 1933, §§ 3(b), 19, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c(b), 77s (1970), the SEC has
developed the Regulation A registration format which generally provides a simplified registration
procedure if the aggregate issue is less than $500,000. 17 C.F.R. § 230.254(a) (1972), as amended,
37 Fed. Reg. 599 (effective Apr. 15, 1972).
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sional determination that not all transactions demand this protection,8
section 4(2) provides that "transactions by an issuer not involving any
public offering"9 need not be registered. Although the private offering
exemption originally may have been intended to cover isolated sales of
securities to particular individuals,'" or to facilitate the promotion of
small business ventures by a few closely related persons," the exemp-
tion's attractiveness to issuers quickly led to its widespread use-and to
some abuse. 12 Consequently, a need arose to define its parameters more
sharply. Early guidelines released by the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission suggested merely that an offering might be classified as public
or private by examining the particular characteristics of the offering
itself, such as the number of offerees, their relationship to each other
and to the issuer, the number of units offered, the size of the offering,
and the manner in which the offering was made. 3 A second and equally
8. The Securities Act of 1933 "carefully exempts from its application certain types of securi-
ties and securities transactions where there is no practical need for its application or where the
public benefits are too remote." H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1933). See I L. Loss,
SECURITIES REGULATION 653 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Loss]; Orrick, Non-Public Offer-
ings of Corporate Securities-Limitations on the Exemption Under the Federal Securities Act, 21
U. PIr. L. REV. 1 (1959).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1970).
10. SEC Securities Act Release No. 285 (Jan. 24, 1935); 1 Loss, supra note 8, at 653; Israels,
Some Commercial Overtones of Private Placement, 45 VA. L. REV. 851 (1959).
I1. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962); Steffen, The Private Placement
Exemption: What To Do About A Fortuitous Combination in Restraint of Trade, 30 U. CHI. L.
REV. 211 (1963); 1971 DUKE L.J. 1017, 1018.
12. Since the adoption of the 1933 Act, both the volume and value of private offerings have
skyrocketed. Although only 3% of all securities sales were privately placed between 1900 and 1933,
this volume increased to 42% between 1934 and 1963. The annual value of sales increased during
the same period from approximately $92,000,000 in 1934 to $6,400,000,000 in 1963. See Note, The
Investment-Intent Dilemma in Secondary Transactions, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1043, 1044-45 (1964).
See also I Loss, supra note 8, at 689; 4 id. at 2662 (Supp. 1969); Cohan, Should Direct Placements
Be Registered?, 43 N.C.L. REV. 298, 300 (1965). The lower costs, the greater speed, flexibility,
and privacy; the fear that the filing might later be used against a registrant trying to establish that
the Act is inapplicable; and the desire to avoid the individual liability imposed by §§ 11, 12(2),
and 17 of the Act for false or fraudulent registration statements, prospectuses, or communications
all explain the increased reliance on the private exemption. See generally I Loss, supra note 8, at
693-94; Victor & Bedrick, Private Offering: Hazards for the Unwary, 45 VA. L. REV. 869 (1959);
Note, supra at 1045. However, "[a]dmitted abuses in what were patently artificial claims of the
availability of the exemption to financings of extensive scope frequently have resulted in both
Commission and court decisions of a sweeping nature, furnishing language quotable in subsequent
cases where the claim to the exemption was bona fide." Meer, The Private Offering Exemption
Under the Federal Securities Act-A Study in Administrative and Judicial Contraction, 20 Sw.
L.J. 503, 514 (1966). For examples of such abuse see Sargent, supra note 7, at 892; 1971 DUKE
L.J. 1017, 1018.
13. SEC Securities Act Release No. 285 (Jan. 24, 1935). Under the early tests, an issue to
25 or fewer offerees was generally considered safe. I Loss, supra note 8, at 662; Sargent, supra
note 6, at 119.
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imprecise approach looked to the particular class of offerees and held
an offer private when the issuer could prove some sensible relation
between the means used to select the members of the class and the
purpose for which the selection was made. 4 These tests, however, ig-
nored the policies underlying the Act and proved unsatisfactory when a
transaction demanding the protegtion of registration could nevertheless
qualify as private. 5 Recognizing the need to establish a more workable
standard, the Supreme Court in SEC v. Ralston Purina Co.'6 noted that
the Act's registration provisions are designed to protect an uninformed
investing public by disclosing necessary and otherwise unavailable infor-
mation. 7 Accordingly, the Court held that transactions may qualify for
the exemption only when they involve offerees whose knowledge of and
access to information obviate the necessity for public registration."
Under this test the private offering classification turns on the needs of
the particular offerees for the protection of the Act, and the surrounding
circumstances are relevant only to the degree that they reflect the
knowledge or access of the offerees.11 Drawing on the Ralston doctrine
that knowledge and access justify waiving the registration requirements
by identifying a class of offerees who can fend for themselves, 2 the
courts have concluded that these criteria may establish a legitimate
private placement only if the offerees possess sufficient investment expe-
rience and sophistication to evaluate independently the proposed pur-
chase. 2' Since, however, sophisticated investors may exert considerable
leverage to extract from an issuer all the information they need to make
informed investment decisions, 22 some courts have distinguished be-
tween the small investor and the large institutional one, implying that,
14. See SEC v. Sunbeam Gold Mines, 95 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1938); Orrick, supra note 8, at
7; Note, supra note 12, at 1048.
15. Note, supra note 12, at 1049; cf. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 102 F. Supp. 964 (E.D.
Mo.), affd, 200 F.2d 85 (8th Cir. 1952), rev'd, 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
16. 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
17. Id. at 124.
18. Id. at 125; see Note, supra note 12, at 1049.
19. See 346 U.S. at 125; Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680,
687-89 (5th Cir. 1971). Historically, a persuasive surrounding circumstance has been the number
of offerees. The recent flood of decisions disavowing any safe numerical test has limited even
further the reliability of surrounding circumstances as a guide. 4 Loss, supra note 8, at 2644 (Supp.
1969).
20. 346 U.S. at 125.
21. See, e.g., Garfield v. Strain, 320 F.2d 116 (10th Cir. 1963); Woodward v. Wright, 266
F.2d 108 (10th Cir. 1959); Repass v. Rees, 174 F. Supp. 898 (D. Colo. 1959); Patton, The Private
Offering: A Simplified Analysis of the Initial Placement, 27 Bus. LAW. 1089, 1090-92 (1972). The
inference of sophistication that prior investment experience creates, however, "is only as strong as
the correlation between the circumstances of the prior and preset investments." Id. at 1091.
22. Professor Loss observes that "[s]ometimes they seem to elicit even more information
than the SEC does." I Loss, supra note 8, at 663.
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at least in the case of institutions, sophistication renders the requirement
of access superfluous. 3 Another approach has reasoned, however, that
without actual access to all necessary information, an investor's sophis-
tication gives him no protection.24 In holding that an offering made only
to sophisticated businessmen was nevertheless public, the court in Hill
York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc. 25 noted that merely fur-
nishing offerees the same information normally found in a registration
statement does not, in and of itself, establish the right to the exemp-
tion.26 Rather, the court stressed as determinative the existence of a
privileged relationship between issuer and offeree that would provide
information and access sufficient to make registration unnecessaryY In
United States v. Custer Channel Wing Corp.,21 the issuer argued that
an investment letter signed by the purchaser acknowledging access to
all desired information was sufficient evidence of the purchaser's need
for no further protection. The court held, however, that since such
letters were intended primarily to caution the offeree against further
distribution of the securities, they could not, absent proof of actual
access to the information, establish a private offering.29 Incorporating
23. Value Line Fund, Inc. v. Marcus, [1964-66 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
, 91,523 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); 1971 DUKE L.J. 1017, 1020; see BNA SEc. REG. & L. REP. No. 144,
B-I, -3 (Mar. 22, 1972).
24. E.g., Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680, 690 (5th Cir.
1971); United States v. Custer Channel Wing Corp., 376 F.2d 675 (4th Cir. 1967); see I Loss,
supra note 8, at 657 n.53. In Henderson v. Hayden, Stone Inc., 461 F.2d 1069 (5th Cir. 1972), a
sophisticated individual investor who knew when he bought the securities that they were unregis-
tered was allowed rescission of the sale on the ground that the offering was not private within the
meaning of § 4(2). The court held that in absence of proof that the purchaser had knowledge of
the business affairs of the company, that he had the same kind of information as would appear in
a registration statement, and that he had access to such information, the issuer failed to sustain
his burden of proof as required by the Hill York decision and could not rely on the investor's
sophistication to establish the exemption.
25. 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971).
26. Id. at 688 n.5; accord, In re D.F. Bernheimer & Co., [1961-64 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. 76,895; SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7000 (Jan. 23, 1963); SEC
Securities Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962); 4 Loss, supra note 8, at 2632 (Supp. 1969).
27. 448,F.2d 680, 688 & n.6. Although this relationship has never been precisely defined,
the court's language reveals the type of relationship it was contemplating: ". . . [an offering] made
to a diverse and unrelated group, i.e. lawyers, grocers, plumbers, etc. . . . would have the appear-
ance of being public; but an offering to a select group of high executive officers of the issuer who
know each other and of course have similar interests and knowledge of the offering would more
likely be characterized as a private offering." 448 F.2d at 688. Again, a private offering is one
"where the public interest is ... remote and the relationship between the issuer and offeree. ..
creates special advantages in the offerees substantially different from the status of members of the
public at large to be able to obtain all necessary information about the issuer and its securities."
Orrick, supra note 8, at 8. Garfield v. Strain, 320 F.2d 116 (10th Cir. 1963), demonstrates some
characteristics of a sufficiently close relationship.
28. 376 F.2d 675 (4th Cir. 1967).
29. Id. at 679; cf SEC Securities Act Release No. 5121 (Dec. 30, 1970).
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the principles announced in Hill York and Custer Channel Wing, the
court in Lively v. Hirschfeld"0 concluded that the Ralston decision
contemplated offerees who both possessed superior business experience
and skill and were fully informed as to all relevant data of the particular
issuer." Although it has not eliminated the private exemption, this line
of decisions has severely restricted its availability and led the securities
bar to question its continued viability.
32
In the instant case, the court found that plaintiff's evidence of
Continental's use of interstate facilities to offer or sell unregistered
securities established a prima facie case; it then ruled that to prevail on
its section 4(2) defense Continental had to demonstrate with explicit,
exact proof-rather than its own conclusive statements-that its offer-
ees did not require the protection of the Act. Quoting from its opinion
in Hill York, 33 the court reaffirmed that the mere disclosure of the
same information which would appear in a registration statement will
not assure the exemption, and that the offerees' need for protection can
be eliminated only when a privileged relationship with the issuer gives
the offerees present knowledge and access to such data. The court then
looked to the Custer Channel Wing decision and observed that an in-
vestment letter signed by the offerees asserting that access to any desired
information was available cannot by itself establish the requisite privi-
leged relationship. Although it acknowledged that numbers are not de-
terminative, the court noted that the concept of a privileged relationship
seems inconsistent with the idea of a large number of offerees, and found
that defendant's failure to establish that the instant group of offerees
was not larger than the SEC asserted, permitted the inference that more
offerees did exist. Drawing on a dictum in the Lively opinion that a
meaningful application of the Ralston test requires the test to be satis-
fied for all offerees, 31 the court concluded that a successful section 4(2)
defense requires the issuer to prove that a privileged relationship with
the issuer afforded every offeree actual access to all information con-
30. 440 F.2d 631 (10th Cir. 1971).
31. Id. at 633; see 1971 DUKE L.J. 1017, 1021-22.
32. See generally BNA SEc. REG. & L. REP. No. 144, B-I (Mar. 22, 1972).
33. "However, mere disclosure of the same information as is required in a registration
statement is not the alpha and the omega, as Professor Loss has noted. '. .. this says too much if
it implies that-the exemption is assured. . . by giving each offeree the same information that would
be contained in a registration statement though without the statutory safeguards and sanctions.'"
SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co., 463 F.2d 137, 160 (5th Cir. 1972).
34. Although the instant court refers to this conclusion as the holding of Lively, 463 F.2d at
160, the Lively court merely found that the Ralston test was satisfied for none of the offerees.
Accordingly, that court's statement that the private offering exemption requires that the test be
satisfied for all offerees, 440 F.2d 631, 633 (10th Cir. 1971), is at best dictum.
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cerning the issuer that he requested or required in making an informed
investment decision.31
The instant case represents the logical conclusion of a series of
cases following the Ralston decision that has given the section 4(2)
exemption an increasingly narrow construction. If read strictly, the
court's holding could require that a transaction may qualify as a private
offering only when each offeree stands in such a privileged relationship
to the issuer that by virtue of the relationship he has actual access to
any information concerning the issuer that he considers relevant to his
investment decision." Such a criterion, if vigorously enforced, could
limit the class of permissible private offerees to a few highly placed key
employees of the issuing company.17 At the very least, the decision
holds that the issuer must prove the financial sophistication of every
offeree, issue each prospective investor a thoroughly descriptive offering
circular, and then hold a face-to-face conference between the principal
officers of the issuer and the offerees, at which all the investors are
provided both specific information concerning the company and any
other additional information they might want.3 Although these re-
35. Since defendant could not establish the requisite relationship and access as to all offerees,
the court ruled that it was not entitled to the private offering exemption. Having disposed of the
case on this basis, the court did not have to consider the second requirement of a private offer-
ing-whether the purchasers took for investment (private offering) or for distribution (public
offering). See 463 F.2d at 159. Turning to the issue of the permanent injunction, the court con-
cluded that Continental's recent violations of § 5 should be read in conjunction with the 1967
violations that led to the issuance of the temporary injunction. On this basis the court held that a
permanent injunction was warranted' Id at 162.
36. Although the Fifth Circuit's decision is quite restrictive, the SEC's brief to the court
argued for an even narrower application of § 4(2). For instance, the SEC had suggested that each
offeree must have a relationship to the company "tantamount to an 'insider' in terms of his ability
to know, to understand, and to verify for himself all of the relevant facts about the company and
its securities. This type of offeree through his own knowledge, sophistication and unfettered access
to the citadels of corporate power and decision-making can protect himself; he does not require
the protections of the Act." BNA SEc. REG. & L. REP. No. 155, A-10 (June 7, 1972). Such
language does not, however, appear in the court's opinion.
It is not entirely clear just who determines what "desired" information must be available to
the investor-the offeree himself, the issuer, the SEC, or the courts. The broad language of the
decisions, however, implies that the discretion lies with the offeree.
37. See 1971 DUKE L.J. 1017, 1022.
38. Panel Discussion Before the ABA Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law,
BNA SEc. REG. & L. REP. No. 167, A-9, -10 (Aug. 30, 1972) (comments by Herbert S. Wander).
Concerning the required proof of sophistication, Wander notes that while proving sophistication
may be quite difficult, "I think deep down we all know that doctors aren't sophisticated investors
and if anyone need[s] the protection of a prospectus, they [do]." Id. at A-10. Referring to the face-
to-face meeting and personal relationship requirement, he acknowledges that "perhaps this is a
cosmetic approach and it may not work, but I think this is what the courts appear to want, and
therefore I would provide it." Id.
1972] RECENT CASES
quirements might not threaten the position of the institutional inves-
tor, 9 they seem certain to eliminate almost all private offerings to
individual investors. In light of the original intent of Congress to pre-
serve the private offering for certain individual investors, the instant
decision seems undesirable. Absent the section 4(2) exemption, the small
or medium-sized company seeking to raise new capital from interstate
sources - or even the individual wishing to promote a new business
venture - must file either a full registration form or the abridged
Regulation A statement." The cost of the former may be prohibitive,41
and the latter, which costs nearly as much as the full statement," is
available only for certain issues totaling less than 500,000 dollars.
4 3
Unable to raise new capital without risking the civil" and criminal
4 5
sanctions of the Securities Act, the small-business sector of the economy
would face a difficult and uncertain future." Recognizing this prospect,
the SEC - its broad arguments in the instant case notwithstanding -
is currently taking steps to ensure the continued availability of the pri-
vate offering exemption. Recent pronouncements by Commissioner
Owens that, at least insofar as institutional investors are concerned,
39. See generally BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 155, A-9 (June 7, 1972); BNA SEc. REG.
& L. REP. No. 157, A-10 (June 1, 1972); 1971 DUKE L.J. 1017, 1022. The instant case is easily
limited on its facts to apply onlyto noninstitutional, individual private investors. Moreover, fears
that the increasingly restrictive interpretations of the § 4(2) exemption given by the courts would
preclude the institutional investor from the private offering exemption have not been realized. That
the forthcoming Securities Act Rule 146 will not even consider institutional investors when deter-
mining whether an offering is public or private, see note 51 infra and accompanying text, further
supports the inference that the SEC plans no assault on the institutional investor's reliance on
§ 4(2). Cf. BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 166, A-3 (Aug. 23, 1972) (Fifth Circuit's refusal to
grant Continental a review en banc). The court did not permit Continental to offer as evidence an
SEC No-Action letter granted to an issuer whose 25 offerees would not satisfy the strict "privileged
relation" test of Continental, but who all had net worth exceeding $250,000, and who in any one
of the last 3 years were in the 50% tax bracket, if depreciation and capital losses were added back.
This action by the court reflects judicial concurrence in the SEC's distinction between the unso-
phisticated individual investor and the sophisticated investor whose bargaining power rivals that
of the institutions.
40. See note 7 supra.
41. Sargent, supra note 6, at 123.
42. Meer, supra note 12, at 504.
43. 17 C.F.R. § 230.254(a) (1972), as amended, 37 Fed. Reg. 599 (effective Apr. 15, 1972).
44. 15 U.S.C. § 771(I) (1970).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1970).
46. Sargent, supra note 6, at 124: "We are faced today . . . with a complete drying up of
risk capital which otherwise might be available to young, unseasoned, honest companies. . . whose
potential for success is . . . tremendous. Many companies with legitimate aims, a sound business
venture and good management cannot produce their product because of a lack of available risk
capital at reasonable rates." See also Owen, The Private Offering and Intrastate Exemptions
Under the Securities Act of 1933, in SELECTED ARTICLES ON FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW 165
(1968).
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language found in the SEC's brief to the Fifth Circuit may have been
"overly restrictive, 47 indicate that the SEC may be willing to limit its
interpretation of the law to the particular facts of the instant case.4"
Moreover, the Commission is currently preparing Securities Act Rule
146 to establish with greater certainty the conditions under which reli-
ance on section 4(2) is warranted.49 The rule apparently will allow the
exemption when there has been no general advertising and when the sale
has resulted from a negotiated transaction at which each buyer was
represented by an advisor. The number of buyers will be limited to 35,50
not counting institutional investors.5' Additionally, the "access of an
advisor or representative of a buyer would be imputed to the buyer and
• . . there would be a contractual commitment to provide continued
access to infornation about the affairs of the issuer. 52 Finally, the rule
will establish a suitability test to determine from the buyer's financial
circumstances and his, or his representative's, business sophistication
whether the buyer requires the protection afforded by registration.1
3
These provisions reflect both current state practices concerning the pri-
vate offering 4 and the recommendations of the American Law Insti-
tute's proposed Federal Securities Code.55 This effort to establish more
objective standards for determining the availability of the private place-
ment may reflect not only a growing dissatisfaction with the impractical
sophistication and access criteria, but also a feeling that the rationale
47. BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 152, A-9 (May 17, 1972).
48. The facts of the instant case may well place it among those cases whose abuses of the
private offering exemption have resulted in excessively broad decisions with sweeping dicta. See
Meer, supra note 12, at 514. The Commission's recent efforts to quiet the securities bar's violent
reaction to Continental implies an awareness on its part that it went further than was necessary to
stop Continental.
The Commission is maintaining its stand on the instant case, however. For a report on the
Fifth Circuit's denial of Continental's request for a review en banc see BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP.
No. 166, A-3 (Aug. 23, 1972).
49. Speech by Chairman Casey Before the ABA Section of Corporation, Banking and
Business Law, BNA SEc. REG. & L. Rep. No. 165, F-I (Aug. 16, 1972).
50. It is noteworthy that the numerical standard will be applied to purchasers, rather than
offerees. This application recognizes that an offeree who does not buy is not hurt. See ALI
FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 227, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1972). The fact that an offering
to 100 prospective purchasers often yields fewer than 25 ultimate investors provides additional
support for a number-of-buyers test. See Sargent, supra note 6, at 124.
51. The rule apparently will define institutional investors as "those who purchase for cash
in a substantial amount, which might be $50,000 or $100,000." Speech by Chairman Casey Before
the ABA Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law, BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. No.
165, F-I (Aug. 16, 1972).
52. Id.
53. Id.
5.4. For an extensive catalogue of current (1969) state procedures see 4 Loss, supra note 8,
at 2634-41 (Supp. 1969).
55. ALl FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 227 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1972).
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underlying the private offering exemption is not that sophisticated and
knowledgeable investors do not require the Act's protection, but that the
benefits to investors derived from registration do not always justify the
attending burdens upon the offeror.55 Noting that "small offerings are
simply not worth the time, trouble, and money required for registra-
tion," '57 this view weighs the burdens of registration against the protec-
tion it affords and concludes that a numbers test, or other objective
standard, may appropriately be applied to this determination." Since an
effective registration system can exist only where enforcement and po-
tential liability are predictable, 59 attempts to render the private/public
offering distinction more objective are both desirable and necessary.
Nevertheless, the continued utility of such subjective criteria as knowl-
edge, sophistication, and access must not be overlooked. If untempered
reliance on a prescribed investor profile precludes all but the very
wealthy from the class of legitimate private placement offerees, then the
lot of the small-business sector currently threatened by the judicial limi-
tations on the section 4(2) exemption will hardly be improved. Further-
more, if a single dispute over contractual access provisions at some
indefinite future time could void an otherwise qualified private offering
and subject the issuer to numerous personal liability and rescission suits,
the registration exemption still might not offer a feasible alternative to
the burdens of section 5 compliance. While the proposed rule does not
appear to eliminate all subjectivity, the extent to which it offers a dan-
gerously mechanical evaluation of an offering's private nature will be
determined only by the construction the courts, the Commission, and
the securities bar will give it. The SEC is -clearly acting to preclude
further decisions like the instant one - decisions that are intellectually
56. Panel Discussion Before the ABA Section on Corporation, Banking and Business Law,
BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 167, A-9, -13 (Aug. 30, 1972) (comments by Richard M. Phillips).
57. Id. at A-13.
58. Id.1rhe movement toward objective standards in an effort to find some workable solution
to the private placement dilemma is evident throughout the investment field. In a memorandum
to the Real Estate Advisory Committee, which is evaluating for the SEC what real estate interests
qualify as securities under the 1933 Act, the Securities Industry Association has noted the depend-
ency of the small or medium-sized investor on the private offering exemption and has recom-
mended that the burden of proving customer suitability for real estate investment be placed with
the customer instead of with the broker or underwriter; the Association would require the investor
to be in the 50% tax bracket with a net worth of at least $50,000, and with commitments to tax
shelter investments bearing "a reasonable relationship to his net worth." BNA SEC REG. & L. REP.
No. 167, A-18, -20 (Aug. 30, 1972). Similarly, amendments to the regulations controlling real
estate syndications proposed by the California Commission of Corporations establish a suitability
profile for offerees based on annual income, liquid net worth, and amount invested. BNA SEC.
REG. & L. REP. No. 162, A-6 (July 26, 1972).
59. See Speech by Chairman Casey Before the ABA Section of Corporation, Banking and
Business Law, BNA SEc. REG. & L. REP. No. 165, F-I, -3 (Aug. 16, 1972).
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and logically sound, but have unreasonable or undesirable practical
impact. Although the continued strength of the small-business sector of
the economy demands that the approach of the instant case toward the
private offering exemption be substantially modified, the Commission
must take care to ensure that its remedial efforts do not unwittingly
further the attack on section 4(2).
Torts-Joint Tort-feasors-Apportionment of Damages
Among Negligent Joint Tort-feasors Based upon Relative
Responsibility of Parties
Plaintiff brought an action for damages against defendant manu-
facturer, alleging that defendant had negligently caused the death of her
husband.' Plaintiff contended that defendant had been negligent in fail-
ing to label properly a poisonous insecticide to warn users of potential
dangers and in providing no instructions for the proper use of the poi-
son. Defendant filed a third-party complaint 2 against decedent's em-
ployer 3 demanding judgment for any recovery that plaintiff might be
awarded in the original action.4 Defendant contended that if decedent's
death was the result of negligence by any party, it was the" 'active and
primary negligence'" of the employer rather than defendant's own neg-
ligence, if any, which was "'merely passive and secondary.'" Main-
1. Plaintiffs husband, an employee of George Urban Milling Company, died while cleaning
his employer's grain storage bin. The bin had been fumigated with methyl bromide, a poisonous
and highly volatile chemical produced by defendant manufacturer, Dow Chemical Company, for
use in controlling storage insects and mites.
2. Defendant served a third-party summons and complaint pursuant to N.Y. Cv. PRAC.
LAW § 1007 (McKinney 1963). For a general discussion of third-party practice (impleader) see F.
JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 505-10 (1965).
3. Defendant also brought a third-party complaint against the fumigating company, McLeod
Industrial Fumigators & City Exterminators, Inc., but that action was not involved in the appeal.
4. Plaintiff could not have brought an action for negligence against the employer, because
New York's workmen's compensation statute abrogated the employer's common-law tort liability.
N.Y. WORKMEN'S ComP. LAW § II (McKinney 1965) provides in part: "The liability of an
employer prescribed by the last preceding section shall be exclusive and in place of any other
liability whatsoever, to such employee, his personal representatives, husband, parents, dependents
or next of kin, or anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages, at common law or otherwise on
account of such injury or death ...." N.Y. WORKMEN'S CoMP. LAW § 29 (McKinney 1965)
allows the dependents of a deceased employee to bring an action against an allegedly negligent
third-party tort-feasor without losing the compensation provided by statute. Cf. Taylor v. New
York Cent. R.R., 294 N.Y. 397, 62 N.E.2d 777 (1945).
5. Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 282 N.E.2d 288, 290, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 385 (1972). Defendant
alleged that the employer was negligent in failing to take proper precautions in fumigating with
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taining that defendant's own active negligence barred the impleader
action under New York law, the employer moved to dismiss the third-
party complaint. The Supreme Court at Special Term, Erie County,
entered an order denying the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court,
Appellate Division, reversed and dismissed the third-party complaint.'
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, held, reversed. A defendant in an
action for negligence may bring a third-party action against other negli-
gent joint tort-feasors to obtain apportionment of damages based upon
the relative responsibility of the parties. Dole v. Dow Chemical
Company, 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972).
The contemporary principles of law that govern apportionment of
damages among joint tort-feasors7 can be traced to the English case of
Merryweather v. Nixan, in which the court denied contribution between
tort-feasors against whom a joint judgment for conversion had been
rendered. The court in Merryweather apparently grounded its decision
on the belief that the tort-feasors who had acted intentionally and in
concert should not benefit from their own deliberate wrongdoing.9 A
later English decision sought to confine the "no contribution" rule to
cases in which the party seeking redress could be presumed to have
known that he was committing an unlawful act."° Although a few courts
applied the rule against contribution to cases of mere negligence, acci-
dent, or mistake," the more accepted English view appears to have been
that contribution was allowed in cases of vicarious liability, negligence,
or other unintentional breaches of the law.1 2 The early American cases
the insecticide, in using untrained personnel to perform the work, in failing to follow instructions
on the insecticide container's label and in literature provided by defendant, and in failing to test
the fumigated premises before allowing employees to re-enter.
6. Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 35 App. Div. 2d 149, 316 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1970).
7. In its original sense, the term "joint tort-feasors" referred to an intentional concert of
action among 2 or more persons. More recently, it has been expanded to include all who are jointly
liable for a particular tort, whether their individual actions were concerted, concurrent, or even
successive in time. Under this definition, 2 individuals whose separate acts of negligence combine
to produce a single, indivisible injury, as in the instant case, are "joint tort-feasors." Leflar,
Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 130, 131 n.9 (1932). See Knell
v. Feltman, 174 F.2d 662, 663 n.l (D.C. Cir. 1949); 1. F. HARPER & F. JAMES, TORTS § 10.1, at
693-94 (1956).
8. 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799). For a general discussion of Merryweather see Reath,
Contribution Between Persons Jointly Charged for Negligence-Merryweather v. Nixan, 12 HARV.
L. REV. 176 (1898); Williams, The Rule in Merryweather v. Nixan, 17 L.Q. REV. 293 (1901).
9. See W. PROSSER, TORTS 305 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
10. Adamson v. Jarvis, 130 Eng. Rep. 693, 696 (C.P. 1827). The case is discussed in Wil-
liams, supra note 8, at 295-96.
II. See J. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 687 (3d ed. 1965), citing The Englishman & The
Australia, [1895] P. 212.
12. PROSSER, supra note 9, at 306. In Palmer v. Wick & Pulteneytown S.S. Co., [1894] A.C.
318, 324, Lord Chancellor Herschell criticized Merryweather: "It is now too late to question that
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also applied the Merryweather rule to forbid contribution only between
intentional wrongdoers, 13 but later American courts neglected to con-
sider the policy supporting the no-contribution rule; 4 the great majority
of American jurisdictions applied the rule to refuse contribution in all
cases, even when independent acts of negligence had concurred to pro-
duce a single, indivisible injury. 5 The no-contribution rule ultimately
became an important element of New York tort law.' Application of
the rule often produced inequitable results. For example, a single negli-
gent joint tort-feasor might be held liable for all damages caused by his
negligent co-tort-feasors. For this reason, several commentators sug-
gested that legislative revisions represented the best hope for dislodging
the entrenched common-law doctrine and providing contribution among
negligent joint tort-feasors. 7 In 1928, the New York legislature modi-
fied the common-law bar against contribution by enacting section 211-
a of the Civil Practice Act," which allows contribution when a joint
judgment is awarded against two or more defendants and one defendant
pays more than his pro rata share. By conditioning the right to contribu-
tion upon the plaintiff's election to sue more than one defendant, how-
ever, the provision failed to remedy all of the inequities inherent in the
common-law rule. 9 Persisting difficulties with the rule against contribu-
decision in this country; but when I am asked to hold it to be part of the law of Scotland, I am
bound to say that it does not appear to me to be founded on any principle of justice or equity, or
even of public policy, which justified its extension to the jurisprudence of other countries." Great
Britain finally abolished the rule against contribution by statute. Law Reform (Married Women
and Tortfeasors) Act, 25 & 26 Geo. 5, c. 30, § 6(1) (1935). For a discussion of the English statute
see G. WILLIAMS, JOINT TORTS AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE §§ 28-31 (1951).
13. See, e.g., Bailey v. Bussing, 28 Conn. 453 (1859); Thweatt's Adm'r v. Jones, 22 Va. (I
Rand.) 328 (1823). See generally Reath, supra note 8.
14. Prosser attributes this result to the greatly increased availability ofjoinder which allowed
tort-feasors who had merely caused the same damage to be joined in one action. These "joint tort-
feasors" were mistakenly considered to be the same joint tort-feasors to whom the common-law
rule against contribution originally applied. In fact, the original usage of the term "joint tort-
feasors" was much narrower, connoting intentional tort-feasors acting in concert. See PROSSFR,
supra note 9, at 306.
15. Id.
16. For a discussion of the early cases that adopted the Merryweather rule in New York
see NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMM'N, REPORT 716-17 (1936)[hereinafter cited as 1936 REPORT].
Andrews v. Murray, 33 Barb. S.C. 354 (N.Y. 1861), is an early case often cited to sustain the view
that negligent tort-feasors cannot secure contribution from each other. 1936 REPORT, supra, at 717
n.20.
17. For a discussion of some of these proposed legislative changes see C. GREGORY, LEGISLA-
TIVE Loss DISTRIBUTION IN NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS 11-45 (1936).
18. Section 211-a is now N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 1401 (McKinney 1963).
19. 1936 REPORT, supra note 16, at 704. Making the right to contribution depend upon
plaintiffs choice of defendants provides fertile ground for collusion between the potential defen-
dants and plaintiff. See PROSSER, supra note 9, at 307, and cases therein cited.
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tion, even as modified by statute,"0 motivated the New York courts and
others to expand the doctrine of indemnity2' to apply to the recovery of
damages among negligent joint tort-feasors. Although the right to in-
demnity originally developed in the context of express contractual obli-
gations, the right to indemnity between persons liable for a tort gener-
ally was classified as quasi contractual in nature. Between joint tort-
feasors, the obligation to indemnify was based on the court's no-
tion-influenced by equitable considerations-of fairness between the
parties.22 When both joint tort-feasors were negligent but there was a
considerable disparity between the degrees of their negligence, the New
York courts frequently found an indemnity contract "implied by law,"
imposing upon the more negligent party the obligation to indemnify the
less negligent.23 Although other state courts have formulated many
tests2 1 for determining whether the difference in degrees of negligence
between joint tort-feasors warrants an award of indemnity, the "active-
passive" negligence test has been the test most commonly relied upon
by New York courts to determine if a right to indemnity exists.25 Al-
though the evolving indemnity doctrine served to shift the unfair burden
of damages in certain instances,2 the doctrine was applicable only to
20. The statutory right of contribution is limited to cases in which ajoint judgment has been
awarded, N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 1401 (McKinney 1963), and has no effect in a situation like
that of the instant case, in which a joint tort-feasor has a special defense against the original
plaintiff. In the instant case, plaintiff could not sue the grain company for negligence, since the
company's common-law tort liability was abrogated by workmen's compensation legislation. As a
result, Dow Chemical Company could not sue the grain company for contribution in a third-party
action because plaintiff had not obtained a joint judgment against both negligent parties. For a
discussion of similar problems see Larson, A Problem in Contribution: The Tortfeasor With an
Individual Defense Against the Injured Party, 1940 Wis. L. REv. 467; Note, Contribution Among
Joint Tortfeasors When One Tortfeasor Enjoys a Special Defense Against Action by the Injured
Party, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 407 (1967).
21. Indemnity allows one discharging the tort obligation to recover over the whole amount
from another joint tort-feasor. Contribution allows a joint tort-feasor discharging the joint obliga-
ton to recover a ratable portion of the total amount from another tort-feasor. See Leflar, supra
note 7, at 130-31. For a more detailed discussion of the development of indemnity in New York
see NEw YORK LAW REVISION COMM'N, REPORT 38-55 (1952) [hereinafter cited as 1952 REPORT];
Meriam & Thornton, Indemnity Between Tort-Feasors: An Evolving Doctrine in the New York
Court of Appeals, 25 N.Y.U.L. REV. 845 (1950); Comment, Indemnity Among Joint Tort-feasors
in New York: Active and Passive Negligence and Impleader, 28 FORDHAM L. REV. 782 (1960).
22. Leflar, supra note 7, at 146-47.
23. See Putvin v. Buffalo Elec. Co., 5 N.Y.2d 447, 158 N.E.2d 691,186 N.Y.S.2d 15(1958);
McFall v. Compagnie Maritime Beige, 304 N.Y. 314, 107 N.E.2d 463 (1952).
24. For a discussion of these various tests see Comment, The Allocation of Loss Among
Joint Tortfeasors, 41 S. CAL. L. REV. 728 (1968).
25. Under the "active-passive" test, the "passive" wrongdoer may obtain indemnity from
the "active" wrongdoer. See, e.g., McFall v. Compagnie Maritime Beige, 304 N.Y. 314, 328, 107
N.E.2d 463, 471 (1952). The difficulty lies in distinguishing between "active" and "passive" negli-
gence. See 1952 REPORT, supra note 21, at 53-55.
26. The secondary, or "passive," wrongdoer had the advantage of being able to implead the
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instances in which the difference in degree of negligence between tort-
feasors was considerable. "Actively negligent" joint tort-feasors or par-
ties who were substantially in pari delicto could not meet the standards
required in actions for indemnity. Furthermore, unless the parties both
were subject to a joint money judgment, the common-law rule prevented
the tort-feasors from obtaining contribution.2 1 In short, many negligent
joint tort-feasors were unable to obtain apportionment of damages
through a statutory action for contribution or by a common-law action
for indemnity.
In the instant case, the court initially noted that the common-law
bar to apportionment of damages among joint tort-feasors had been
altered both by statutory provisions allowing contribution and by the
judicial decisions permitting indemnity in certain cases of joint negli-
gence. Examining the "active-passive" negligence test for determining
indemnity in New York, the court then found that the remedy afforded
by the application of that test to negligent joint tort-feasors was uncer-
tain, unpredictable, and possibly unfair. The court considered the recent
New York indemnity cases and the professional commentaries28 and
observed in both a common theme-dissatisfaction with the "active-
passive" test that indicated a movement toward a fairness standard for
apportionment. Furthermore, the court discussed the unfair control that
a plaintiff exercises, through his ability to choose which tort-feasor to
sue, over the adjudication of joint tort responsibility. Recognizing that
the method for apportioning damages among tort-feasors would require
substantial modification, the court held that a defendant in a negligence
action may implead a joint tort-feasor to obtain an apportionment of
damages that is based on the relative responsibility of the parties."
primary, or "active," wrongdoer pursuant to § 193(2) of the Civil Practice Act. See 1952 REPORT,
supra note 21, at 38-39 & n.7 and cases therein cited. N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW § 1007 (McKinney
1963), the successor to § 193(2), provides in part: "After the service of his answer, a defendant
may proceed against a person not a party who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the
plaintiff's claim against him .... "
27. See 1952 REPORT, supra note 21, at 38-39. In Price v. Ryan, 255 N.Y. 16, 173 N.E.
907 (1930), the court, construing § 21 1-a of the Civil Practice Act (now N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW
§ 1401 (McKinney 1963)) in light of the no-contribution rule at common law, held that the remedy
of contribution was expressly confined to cases in which a money judgment had been obtained
against both joint tort-feasors. Additionally, in Fox v. Western N.Y. Motor Lines, Inc., 257 N.Y.
305, 178 N.E. 289 (1931), the court held that a negligent joint tort-feasor seeking contribution could
not, pursuant to § 193(2) of the Civil Practice Act (now N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 1007 (McKinney
(1963)), implead a co-tort-feasor not joined by the plaintiff as required by § 211-a. This had the
effect of denying the use of impleader to joint tort-feasors seeking contribution.
28. See, e.g., Leflar, supra note 7, at 159.
29. The court viewed the question of the relative responsibility of the parties as a question
of fact, to be determined by the jury only if the third-party plaintiff (the original defendant) is found
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The instant case has significantly expanded the New York law
relating to negligent joint tort-feasors in two significant respects-the
substantive recovery rights and statutory procedural rights of joint tort-
feasors. First, the decision of the instant court enlarged recovery rights
among joint tort-feasors by creating a right to apportionment of dam-
ages on the basis of relative culpability. Although it referred to the
apportionment formula as one for "partial indemnification, ' 3 the
court in actuality recognized an unlimited right of contribution among
joint tortfeasors .3  Secondly, the instant decision liberalized the statu-
tory procedural rights of joint tort-feasors by permitting a negligent
joint tort-feasor to implead a co-tort-feasor to obtain apportionment of
damages. This enlargement of impleader actions will provide, in a single
action whenever feasible, a fair apportionment of damages for every
negligent joint tort-feasor. The court's action in expanding both the
substantive recovery rights and statutory procedural rights, however, is
not without precedent in other jurisdictions.3 1 Moreover, legal scholars
negligent. Whether the causes are tried together or separately rests in the court's discretion accord-
ing to the requirements of fairness. 282 N.E.2d at 294-95, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 391-92.
30. Id. at 291, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 386.
31. The term "partial indemnification" is something of a contradiction in terms, because
indemnification commonly refers to full recovery over against a third party. See note 21 supra.
The court clearly had in mind a partial recovery over, or contribution, but avoided using the term
"contribution," apparently because of problems peculiar to the instant case. Under the law of
contribution as formerly interpreted by the New York courts, Dow Chemical Company could not
obtain contribution from the grain company. See note 20 supra. The court thus escaped a direct
confrontation with this prior authority by couching its holding in the language of indemnity. The
instant court apparently has sought to avoid a radical departure from past New York cases on
contribution by expanding the existing doctrine of common-law indemnity. The resulting terminol-
ogy, including the novel use of the term "indemnity," may confuse courts following Dole and cause
them to misconstrue the holding of the case. In a more recent case, the court has characterized
the Dole holding as the "rule of relative contribution," so that perhaps the confusion over terminol-
ogy will be clarified. Kelly v. Long Island Lighting Co., 286 N.E.2d 241, 243, 334 N.Y.S.2d 851,
854 (1972).
32. Before the instant decision, 9 American jurisdictions had rejected the no-contribution
rule at common law and allowed contribution without legislation. See, e.g., Knell v. Feltman, 174
F.2d 662 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Wiener v. United Airlines, 216 F. Supp. 701 (S.D. Cal. 1962)(concluding
that Nevada has abrogated the rule); Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v. Lowe Const. Co., 251 Iowa
27, 99 N.W.2d 421 (1959); Best v. Yerkes, 247 Iowa 800, 77 N.W.2d 23 (1956); Quantray v.
Wicker, 178 La. 289, 151 So. 208 (1933); Bedell v. Reagan, 159 Me. 292, 192 A.2d 24 (1963);
Underwriters at Lloyds v. Smith, 166 Minn. 288, 208 N.W. 13 (1926); Ankeny v. Moffett, 37 Minn.
109, 33 N.W. 320 (1887); Goldman v. Mitchell-Fletcher Co., 292 Pa. 354, 141 A. 231 (1928); Davis
v. Broad St. Garage, 191 Tenn. 320, 232 S.W.2d 355 (1950); Mitchell v. Raymond, 181 Wis. 591,
195 N.W. 855 (1923); Ellis v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 167 Wis. 392, 167 N.W. 1048 (1918). In
addition, 23 states have passed statutes permitting contribution in some form. PROSSER, supra note
9, at 307. A more detailed classification of the jurisdictions can be found in Note, Adjusting Losses
Among Joint Torifeasors in Vehicular Collision Cases, 68 YALE L.J. 964, 981-82 (1959). The
UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS Acr (1939 version) was adopted in 9 jurisdictions
but was withdrawn in 1955 by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws after it was amended
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have been virtually unanimous in their condemnation of the common-
law rule against contribution. 3  By rejecting the common-law rule
against contribution, the New York Court of Appeals has added a
prestigious voice to the mounting trend toward fairer apportionment of
damages among negligent joint tort-feasors. The significance of the
instant case, however, extends beyond its impact on the law of contribu-
tion. By adopting as its standard of apportionment the "relative respon-
sibility"34 of the parties, the court created the equivalent of a compara-
tive negligence action among negligent joint tort-feasors.35 The instant
case marks the first instance in which a court, on its own initiative,
explicitly has imposed the relative apportionment standard.36 This ac-
tion by the court raises the question whether the court will proceed one
step further to adopt a comparative negligence standard in the tradi-
tional single plaintiff-single defendant context, thereby abolishing con-
tributory negligence as a bar to recovery. At least two considerations
militate in favor of such a judicial undertaking. First, proceeding from
proportional contribution to comparative negligence in the traditional
plaintiff-defendant setting would be logically consistent.38 The rule
against contribution and the doctrine of contributory negligence are
both vestiges of the punitive, all-or-nothing tort principles that prevailed
in the early common law.39 Proportional contribution and comparative
negligence represent complementary means of attacking the harshness
of common-law apportionment, because both rest upon a single
extensively in several states. A new version of the Act, proposed in 1955, has been adopted in 4
states. PROSSER, supra at 307 n.63.
33. See, e.g., Bohlen, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 21 CORNELL L.Q.
552 (1936); Leflar, supra note 7. For an original defense of the no-contribution rule see James,
Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors: A Pragmatic Criticism, 54 HARV. L. REV. 1156 (1941).
Contra, Gregory, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors: A Defense, 54 HARV. L. REv. 1170
(1941).
34. 282 N.E.2d at 295, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 392.
35. Most jurisdictions that allow contribution apportion damages equally among joint tort-
feasors, regardless of their relative degrees of culpability. PROSSER, supra note 9, at 310.
36. See id. at 310 & n.87; Note, supra note 32, App. I(A).
37. For a general discussion of comparative negligence see PROSSER, supra note 9, at 433-
39; Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MICH. L. REv. 465 (1953).
38. Cf. James, Kalven, Keeton, Leflar, Malone & Wade, Comments on Maki v.
Frelk-Comparative v. Contributory Negligence: Should the Court or Legislature Decide?, 21
VAND. L. REV. 889, 921 (1968) (Comment of Robert A. Leflar)[the entire work is hereinafter cited
as Comments].
39. Several authorities have noted the close relationship between the no-contribution rule
and contributory negligence. Professor Leflar views both as manifestations of the law's unwilling-
ness to aid persons whose conduct does not conform to legal standards. Leflar, supra note 7, at
130-31. Dean Wade contends that the principal explanation of both can be traced to the no-
compromise, all-or-nothing approach of the common law. Comments, supra note 38, at 940-42
(Comment of John W. Wade). See also K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 143 (1960).
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principle-that fairness requires apportionment of damages on the basis
of the relative culpability of the parties. 0 Secondly, the instant court's
willingness to overturn an established body of judge-made law, rather
than defer to the legislature, 1 suggests the likelihood of further judicial
action to reduce reliance upon the doctrine of contributory negligence.
This argument, however, must be balanced against the fact that no court
to date has been willing to adopt the comparative negligence standard
in the absence of legislative action.42 No compelling reason appears to
preclude judicial modifications of the contributory negligence rule, how-
ever, for it was the courts themselves-and not the legislatures-that
formulated the rule originally. 3 The New York Court of Appeals'
concern in the instant case for implementing certain "'relevant tort
goals' " 4-deterrence, equitable loss sharing by all wrongdoers, effec-
tive loss distribution throughout society, and rapid compensa-
tion' 5-and its overall concern for fairness to the parties may lead the
court to correct the unfairness inherent in contributory negligence,
which places upon one party the entire burden of loss for which two are
responsible." At the very least, the court in the instant case has laid the
40. For further discussion of the relationship between contribution and comparative negli-
gence see C. GREGORY, supra note 17, at 49-55.
41. A bill providing a general right of contribution based on common liability was recom-
mended for passage to the legislature by the New York Law Revision Commission on several
occasions, beginning in 1936. The bill was never enacted. 1952 REPORT, supra note 21, at 27.
Insurance companies have vigorously opposed the passage of contribution statutes in other states,
PROSSER, supra note 9, at 307, and opposition to comparative negligence legislation has come from
the liability insurance companies and from the "habitual defendants." Id. at 438. For an explana-
tion of the factors inhibiting legislative approval of legal reform measures generally see Comments,
supra note 38, at 928-29 (Comment of Robert A. Leflar). For an interesting discussion of the
relative roles of the judiciary and the legislature in reforming tort law see Keeton, Creative
Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75 HARV. L. REV. 463 (1962). Professor Keeton's lift of relevant
factors that determine whether a given area is appropriate for judicial law reform indicates that
the areas of contribution among joint tort-feasors and comparative negligence are highly suitable
for creative judicial decisions. Id. at 506-08. See generally Comments, supra note 38.
42. In 1962 the Illinois Supreme Court asked the Appellate Court for an opinion on whether
adoption of comparative negligence was desirable. After receiving an affirmative answer, Maki v.
Frelk, 85 III. App. 2d 439, 229 N.E.2d 284 (1967), the Supreme Court decided that the matter
should be left to the legislature. Maki v. Frelk, 40 Ill. 2d 193, 239 N.E.2d 445 (1968); accord, Bissen
v. Fujii, 51 Hawaii 636, 466 P.2d 429 (1970); Vincent v. Pabst Brewing Co., 47 Wis. 2d 120, 177
N.W.2d 513 (1970). For a discussion of Maki v. Frelk see PROSSER, supra note 9, at 434-35;
Comments, supra note 38.
43. PRtOSSER, supra note 9, at 434. See generally Comments, supra note 38; Keeton, supra
note 41.
44. 282 N.E.2d at 293, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 389; see Comment, supra note 24.
45. For a general discussion of modern tort goals and their relation to contribution see
Comment, Contribution and Indemnity in California, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 490 (1969).
46. See PROSSER, supra note 9, at 453.
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groundwork for further judicial action that will perhaps produce an
integrated, modernized body of tort law.
47
47. Many members of the New York bar think that the Dole decision presages a judicially
created system of comparative negligence. Interview with Robert A. Leflar, Visiting Professor of
Law, Vanderbilt University, and Director of Appellate Judges Seminars, New York University,
in Nashville, Tennessee, September 6, 1972. A decision by the Supreme Court, Trial Term,
rendered since the instant case, has already broadened the Dole rule-apportionment among
negligent joint tort-feasors based upon relative responsibility-to apportion liability between an
automobile dealer and the manufacturer in an implied warranty case. Walsh v. Ford Motor Co.,
335 N.Y.S.2d 110 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
